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Summary 
Economy and environment interact in different and often complicated ways. An important 
field in which the interrelationship between economy and the environment attracts 
increasing attention is international trade. When adequate environmental policies are 
absent, changes in international trade have negative effects on the environment if they 
increase the general level of economic activity or if they shift activities to areas with 
lower environmental carrying capacities. On the other hand, positive effects on the 
environment occur if changes in trade enhance resource use efficiency, or shift economic 
activities to areas with larger environmental carrying capacities. In addition, trade-induced 
changes in income and its distribution may affect opportunities for environmental manage-
ment. A priori, it is uncertain which effect will prevail in a specific situation. 
Whatever the effects of changes in international trade on the environment, trade-
restricting measures are usually not the most obvious policy instruments to counteract 
possible damage. First-best policy instruments address environmental consequences of 
production or consumption directly, by internalising environmental considerations in pro-
duction and consumption decisions. Trade instruments are usually poor substitutes for 
environmental policies. Even if trade measures are perceived as first-best, as in the case 
of import restrictions for health reasons, the danger is always present that they will be 
captured by protectionists' interests. 
To address national environmental problems, international harmonization of 
environmental standards is generally not needed. Differences in national priorities, in 
availability of environmental and natural resources, and in capacities to cope with 
environmental and natural resource degradation justify variations in environmental 
standards across countries. It is, however, desirable to harmonize principles and measures 
of environmental policy. Tensions between trade and the environment may be reduced by 
global adherence to the polluter pays principle (PPP). 
Costs and benefits of measures to address international or global environmental 
problems will often differ between countries. For tackling these problems, positive 
incentives (financial assistance, transfer of environment-friendly technology) may be 
needed to achieve cooperation of countries for which national benefits are low. Adherence 
to the PPP will generally lead to the non-cooperation of these countries. Negative 
incentives such as discriminatory trade restrictions are not the best way to promote 
cooperation. 
An important policy issue is the impact of agricultural trade liberalisation on the 
environment. Recent work by Anderson and Tyers shows that trade liberalisation would 
cause the expected international prices for agricultural products to be somewhat higher, 
the volume of trade to increase, total production to stay at about the same level, and 
welfare gains to be sufficiently large to fully compensate those who confront losses. 
However, large trade-induced regional shifts in agricultural production would occur, 
implying production increases in the developing world and declines in industrial countries. 
Changes in cropping production from high-priced to low-priced countries would substan-
tially reduce the use of chemicals in world food production. Relocation of meat and milk 
production from intensive grain-feeding enterprises in densely populated rich countries to 
pasture-based enterprises in relatively sparsely populated poorer countries is another 
factor associated with lower use of chemicals such as growth hormones and medicines for 
animals. The shift to less bought-in feeds would also reduce the problems associated with 
animal waste disposal in developed countries. Besides reducing air, soil and water 
contamination by farmers, the greater use of less-intensive production methods would also 
reduce the chemical intake by the world's food consumers on average. 
To illustrate in more detail the analytical and policy questions regarding interna-
tional trade and the environment, the study concludes with four cases of commodities 
whose production and trade involves important environmental externalities: tropical 
timber, grain and grain substitutes, energy resources, and hazardous wastes. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background and purpose 
Economy and environment interact in different ways and at different levels, depending on 
the nature of goods and the nature of environmental externalities. Moreover, environ-
mental effects often display complicated time patterns that may affect the economy of 
future generations and frequently have important transborder or global physical spillovers 
that affect the economy of other nations. 
An important field in which the interrelationship between economy and the 
environment attracts increasing attention is trade liberalisation, in particular in connection 
with the current Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations. Although trade liberalization in 
no way aims at solving environmental problems (and usually would not be the appropriate 
instrument), it undoubtedly has important ecological effects. In particular in agriculture, a 
gradual abolishment of protectionist policies may result in a more rational trading system 
characterized by a better use of resources (including environmental ones), a reduction of 
environmentally harmful inputs, and the disappearance of agricultural surpluses due to 
protectionist policies. Others will argue, however, that more liberalization will only 
increase pressure on environmental resources, in particular in developing countries. 
In many ways, the proposals for reform of the EC agricultural policy (MacSharry 
Plan) face the same questions: what are the environmental consequences of policy-induced 
changes in agricultural production and trade, both inside and outside the EC. 
The present study pays attention to the general effects on the economy and the 
environment of changes in production and trade flows. Such changes can be induced by a 
variety of factors, e.g. changes in international trade agreements, national environmental 
policy or the Common Agricultural Policy. In view of the current proposals for agricul-
tural reform, the study focuses to a large extent, though not exclusively, on international 
trade in agricultural products. Where necessary and relevant, however, other sectors of 
the economy are considered as well. 
The purpose of the study is twofold. One is to develop an analytical framework for 
examining interactions between international trade and the environment. Elements of the 
theory of international trade and protection and the theory of environmental policy are 
used for drawing up the analytical framework. The second purpose of the study is to 
analyse a number of environmental and trade policy issues that are of major concern to 
policy makers at the moment. These policy issues include the desirability of international 
harmonization of environmental standards and measures and the potential consequences of 
trade liberalization measures for the environment. In analysing these issues, use will be 
made of the analytical framework developed previously and the insights from a number of 
studies on international trade and environment that have been published very recently. To 
illustrate in more detail the analytical and policy questions, the study will present a 
number of case studies. 
1.2 Overview of the study 
Analytical framework 
To examine the various issues of international trade and the environment systematically, 
an analytical framework underlying the study is developed first in chapter 2. It starts 
with a review of the concept_ofju^ijrmbie,develo^nienti.a notion which is at the heart of 
any attempt to integrate economy and environment. Several issues are elaborated upon 
including the "notion of full resource cost in the case of environmental degradation, risk , 
and^depjetion^JThe consequences of alternative concepts of sustainable development and 
of several principles that are developed in the context of sustainable development on trade 
possibilities and restrictions are indicated. 
A number of theoretical and policy questions regarding international trade and the 
environment are raised next. The major reason for trade between countries is that it is a 
natural and profitable response to price discrepancies that would exist without is. Such 
discrepancies are largely attributable to international differences in technology and factor 
endowments. When competition is perfect and markets are complete, free trade is best. In 
many cases these conditions do not hold, and the question arises under what conditions is 
there justification for trade restrictions (tariffs and other forms for protection)? Three 
points can be made here. First, the theorem of second-best states that, in the presence of 
missing or distorted markets, the usual conditions for efficiency may not hold. Apart from 
the fact that free trade is not superior in all conditions, the second point is that most trade 
theorists would argue that trade measures do not address the problems (market distortions) 
at the right level: trade measures are typically regarded as second-best, and therefore 
undesirable, solutions. Third, even if trade instruments are perceived as first-best, the 
danger is always present that they will be captured by protectionists' interests. 
International trade may influence environmental quality in several ways: by 
changing production patterns, by imports of products which cause risks to the environ-
ment or health, by transport externalities, and through enhancing economic growth, which 
can have positive or negative influences on the environment. In the assessment of impacts 
it is important to compare the actual situation with the situation resulting from changes in 
trade. It is also important to assess all stages of the life cycle of a product: from 
exploitation of the primary resources, to intermediate products, final products, and waste 
generation. All these stages may cause different environmental problems, and they may 
occur in different regions or countries, linked through interregional or international trade. 
Trade itself (the physical transport) is also a cause of environmental pollution and 
degradation. To analyse the impact of specific trade measures, a classification of 
In economic theory, environmental problems are typically considered as a type of 
environmental effects and a schematic representation of the relationships with production, 
^^consumption, and international trade is given 
A/ -
\V J r market imperfection. Policy instruments to correct these distortions can be grouped into: 
<? direct regulation (permits and standards), economic instruments (charges, subsidies, 
\ deposit-refund, etc.), property rights approaches, and a broad category of pressure and 
persuasion, including voluntary agreements (convenants) between government and indus-
try. The objective of these instruments is to internalize environmental costs so as to 
ensure that the full environmental and resource costs of a traded product (in production, 
transport, use, waste) are paid by the final consumer of the product. 
A guiding principle in environmental policy is the Polluter Pays Principle (PPP), 
which has been adopted by the OECD in 1972. It is also a guiding principle for EC 
environmental policy since the adoption of the Single European Act in 1986. An import-
ant goal of the PPP is to limit distortions in international trade. As regards global and 
transborder environmental effects of nontradable products, differences in environmental 
priorities (related to per capita income levels) may justify the application of the so-called 
Victim Pays Principle (VPP). 
How do environmental policy and international trade interact? It is important to 
distinguish" between domestic and international environmental policies (unilateral or 
multilateral). Domestic environmental policies may be influenced by trade in two ways. 
(1) If the policy is meant to reduce environmental effects of domestic production, the 
competitiveness issue is often raised. Domestic producers may feel that they are discrimi-
nated against foreign competitors who face less strict environmental standards; they 
demand a "level playing field". (2) If the policy is meant to reduce environmental effects 
of domestic consumption, imports may face restriction. Foreign exporters may feel 
discriminated and challenge the trade restriction (Danish beer bottle dispute, US-EC hor-
mones-in-beef dispute). 
Environmental policy in one country may also wish to influence environmental 
pollution or degradation in other countries, because of physical transFordeOpilloYers 
(acid rain) or otherwise (tropical forest degradation). In fact, environmental policy makers 
may consider to use trade instruménïs (with respect to the product causing the problem or 
an unrelated product) to influence other country's environmental policies. This is a 
particularly sensitive area. 
Finally, many international or multilateral environmental agreements have included 
trade provisions. These trade provisions may regulate or ban trade (e.g. in endangered 
species) and usually discriminate against non-signatories. The present GATT disputes 
concerning environmental implications of trade rules illustrate that these rules do not 
totally exclude trade measures based on environmental considerations. 
Trade and environment in agriculture 
A sector where changes in trade and environmental policies will have far-reaching 
consequences is agriculture. World prices for agricultural products are highly distorted as 
a result of domestic policies in industrial and developing countries. Large parts of both 
the developed and developing world face important environmental problems resulting 
from current agricultural practices, albeit for different reasons. Chapter 3 reviews these 
issues. 
Recent developments in the pattern of technological change in agriculture are 
outlined first. Considering resource endowments and access to modern technology as 
major explanatory factors, the economic rationale for these developments is briefly 
discussed. Because of the emphasis on international trade in this study, the impact of 
current agricultural policies on trade receives ample attention. Protection of agriculture in 
the industrialized countries has led to high agricultural prices which, in combination with 
rapid technical progress, have stimulated production - in many cases beyond the point of 
self-sufficiency. Widespread protection of manufacturing has in many developing 
countries resulted in low relative prices for farmers and limited public investment in 
agriculture. Under these circumstances, agricultural production has remained far below its 
potential. 
Based on recent work by Anderson and Tyers, the impact of agricultural trade 
liberalization on the domestic markets of developed and developing countries and on the 
international market is analyzed. Large trade-induced regional shifts in agricultural 
production would occur, of which the environmental consequences are reviewed in 
chapter 4. The final section of chapter 3, dealing with environmental effects of agricul-
tural production in general, provides the basis for this analysis. 
Agriculture has specific environmental effects which differ from the effects of non-
agricultural products. In particular, agricultural production in low-income countries often 
leads to degradation of renewable resources like land, nutrients and water. At higher 
levels of income, farm inputs (labour and land) are increasingly being replaced by non-
farm inputs (capital and variable inputs) which are produced by the industrial sector. The 
intensity of the resulting environmental effects differs considerably between different 
(groups of) countries. As international trade in agricultural products includes many 
perishable and bulk products, their transportation may cause considerable environmental 
externalities. 
Policy questions 
A number of major policy questions concerning trade and environment is examined in 
chapter 4. Adoption of (theoretically sound) environmental policies will generally lead to 
changes in trade flows, as the correction of previous market failures will change compara-
tive advantages between countries. The introduction of environmental policies also raises 
a number of questions regarding a country's competitiveness, harmonization of environ-
mental standards and measures, and the potential role of trade measures. For analytical 
purposes, domestic environmental effects are distinguished from transborder or global 
environmental effects. 
What are the consequences of national environmental policies for international 
trade? There is general agreement that international harmonization of national environ-
mental standards is neither necessary nor desirable. Comparative advantage is based on 
the existence of differences between countries, of which the environment makes up one 
element. In this way, differences in standards can well be an additional source of gainful 
trade. 
At the same time it should be emphasized that harmonization of principles and 
measures governing environmental policy is highly desirable (Polluter Pays Principle as 
the basis for national policies and the Victim Pays Principle to secure co-operation in 
international policy-making). When introduced unilaterally, national environmental 
policies inevitably shift comparative advantages away from the damage-intensive good, 
with adverse consequences for competitiveness, production and income in the short run at 
least. 
To achieve inter-governmental co-operation on international environmental 
policies, positive incentives (financial assistance, transfer of environmentally-friendly 
technology) are more effective than discriminatory trade restrictions or sanctions unrelated 
to the environmental problem at hand. A possible exception is the use of trade measures 
to enforce international co-operation on environmental issues. 
Another important policy issue is the impact of trade liberalization on the environ-
ment. As discussed in chapter 2, free trade maximizes national and global welfare 
provided environmental externalities are corrected through appropriate policies (and a 
number of standard assumptions on the functioning of markets are satisfied). These 
corrective policy measures should be such that the social costs of exporting are taken into 
account by producers. However, for various reasons governments often adopt policies that 
intervene with free trade. Moreover, until now corrective environmental policies have 
only seldomly been undertaken. The last section of chapter 4 therefore examines the 
potential impact of trade liberalization on the environment. Because of the importance of 
agriculture in the current GATT negotiations, the emphasis is on trade in agricultural pro-
ducts. 
Case studies 
Four cases of commodities whose production and international trade involves important 
environmental externalities are presented in chapter 5. The case studies are primarily 
meant to illustrate the various theoretical and policy questions with regard to international 
trade and the environment discussed in the previous chapters. Rather than an in-depth 
analysis of particular commodities, the four examples emphasize the relation to the 
analytical framework provided in this study and the trade and environmental policy 
dilemmas involved. 
Tropical timber and grain and grain substitutes are selected in view of the study's 
focus on international trade in primary (agricultural) products. Both cases illustrate how 
trade distortions (tariff escalation and export subsidies in developed countries and heavy 
protection in a number of developing countries) not only reduce welfare, but in many 
instances are harmful to the environment as well. Provided that adequate environmental 
policies are being followed, both developmental and environmental goals can be served by 
trade liberalisation. With regard to tropical timber - where the impact of international 
trade on deforestation appears to be modest - the arguments presented in favour of 
international compensation payments and against heavy reliance on trade measures accord 
well with the theoretical arguments presented in chapters 2 and 4. 
The other two cases, energy resources and hazardous wastes, illustrate several 
other aspects of the links between production, trade and environment. The analytical 
framework developed in chapter 2 established that, without proper environmental policies 
in countries involved in trade with negative side-effects, the welfare gains from trade may 
be smaller than conventional analysis would suggest. However, the two cases illustrate the 
high cost and detrimental effect on the environment of simply restricting trade. More 
efficient solutions, which achieve environmental objectives at lower cost, include policies 
to improve access to clean energy resources and technology, to minimize (hazardous) 
waste generation, and to encourage environmentally sound waste disposal management, in 
particular in developing countries. 
Conclusions from the present study and recommendations for further work are 
listed in the final chapter. In the appendix, some background information regarding trade 
flows and protection is presented in the form of a number of graphs. 
2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
This chapter presents an analytical framework in which the issue of international trade 
and the environment can be studied. It starts with a review of the concept of sustainable 
development which is at the heart of any attempt to integrate economy and the environ-
ment. It then continues with some brief remarks on the theory of international trade and 
protection. Elements of this theory may be fruitfully applied to the present issue. Next, 
paragraph 2.2.2 outlines some fundamental linkages between trade and the environment. 
Paragraphs 2.2.3 and 2.2.4 review the basics of environmental policy and its relations 
with international trade. The final paragraph deals with the present international trade 
rules as they relate to environmental protection. 
2.1 Sustainable development 
Sustainable development has become a key concept in the environmental debate since the 
Brundtland report (WCED, 1987). RMNO has addressed the issue on several occasions 
(Soeteman, 1988; De Wit, 1990; De Boer, 1992). 
Sustainable development has been defined as: 
"a process of change in which the exploitation of resources, the direction of invest-
ments, the orientation of technological development and institutional changes are 
made consistent with future as well as present needs. " (WCED, 1987). 
The concept of sustainable development has placed the environmental resource base in the 
centre of attention in analyzing economic development. There is an increasing awareness 
that environmental constraints may jeopardize economic development. In the first place, it 
is now recognized that the welfare of people does not only depend on their consumption 
of marketed goods, but also on the quality of the environment they live in. Increased 
consumption which is offset by increased costs imposed by depletion and degradation of 
environmental resources is not necessarily welfare improving and may therefore add little 
to economic development in a broader sense. Second, present environmental damage can 
undermine future productivity. Soils that are degraded, aquifers that are depleted and 
ecosystems that are lost in the name of raising incomes today, can jeopardize the 
prospects for earning income tomorrow (World Bank, 1992). 
In a public lecture, Brundtland has formulated the following requirements for 
sustainable development. First, it requires the elimination of poverty and deprivation. 
Second, it requires the conservation and enhancement of the resource base which alone 
can ensure that the elimination of poverty is permanent. Third, it requires a broadening of 
the concept of development so that it covers not only economic growth but also distribu-
tional and other social aspects. Fourth, and most important, it requires the unification of 
One of the most important questions regarding the operationalization of the concept 
of sustainable development is the question to which extent substitution is possible between 
alternative environmental resources and between environmental and man-made resources. 
Different assumptions lead to different optimal resource use patterns over time. Broadly 
speaking, the two extreme positions are: (1) there is no substitution possible between 
environmental and man-made resources (strong sustainability), and (2) substitution 
between environmental and man-made resources is, in the long-term, unlimited (weak 
sustainability). Evidently, these two positions lead to different policy recommendations. 
Recognizing and accepting the broad and essentially multi-objective nature of 
sustainable development, Pearce et al. (1989) nevertheless emphasize that the 'constancy 
of the natural capital stock' is a necessary condition for sustainable development. Thus, 
Pearce et al. are rather critical to the possibility of substitution between natural and man-
made capital. Substitution within the natural capital stock is possible within certain limits. 
Pearce et al. (1990) have suggested a so-called 'portfolio' approach in a project planning 
context. A project which is contemplated should not be considered on its own, but as a 
part of a group of projects or a project portfolio. This portfolio should include at least 
one project that compensates for the environmental degradation generated by other 
projects in the portfolio to ensure overall sustainability of natural systems. For example, 
if investments in mechanized agriculture or fire-cured tobacco estates lead to problems 
with, respectively, land degradation and fuelwood depletion, then these effects should be 
compensated by soil conservation and reforestation projects. 
Opschoor has introduced the concept of the environmental utilisation space (based 
on Siebert, 1982). The environment has a limited capacity to supply resources and absorb 
wastes, although this capacity may be enhanced by scientific and technological advance. 
Sustainability implies that: 
1) society's use of the environment should not impair the present and future functioning 
of resource regeneration systems, waste absorption systems and the systems supporting 
flows of other environmental services and goods, and 
2) use of nonrenewable resources should be compensated for by at least equivalent 
increases in supplies of renewable or reproducible substitutes. 
The environmental utilisation space - or environmental utilisation possibilities frontier -
can then be defined as the locus of sustainable patterns of economic development in terms 
of their claims on the environment (see e.g. Klaassen and Opschoor, 1991). 
However, more interpretations are possible. They are determined to a great deal by 
1) the extent in which (future) possibilities to substitute environmental and man-made 
resources are feasible, 2) the assessment of what constitutes present and future needs, and 
3) the relative weights of man-made and environmental goods and services in the 
perception of social welfare. Empirically, the weights attached to the availability of 
environmental services and the ability to maintain its productivity and quality, is closely 
related to the level of economic development. If it is accepted that the scale factor is a 
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major characteristic of sustainable development, its actual interpretation will often be 
income-dependent and location-specific (see Van Pelt, Kuyvenhoven and Nijkamp, 1990, 
1991). 
Whichever interpretation one chooses, sustainable use of environmental resources 
is an important element of sustainable development. Evidently, sustainable resource use 
should be achieved in the most cost-effective way. Specifically, it means that sustainable 
use of environmental resources should be achieved with minimum negative effects on 
other social objectives of sustainable development, such as growth of real income per 
capita, equitable income distribution, social and cultural objectives, and so forth. In 
section 2.2.3 various approaches to integrate environmental and economic decision-
making are discussed. 
Even by concentrating on sustainable resource use as a precondition of sustainable 
development, many questions stay open. Which environmental resources should be taken 
into account: only those with direct (potential) economic importance or a wider selec-
tion?; at which spatial levels and at which levels of aggregation?; how should non-
renewable resources be taken into account?; is substitution possible between different 
environmental resources?; should we take into account that technology and knowledge 
may increase the substitution possibilities?; how should we account for uncertainty and 
plain lack of knowledge about long-term ecological processes?; should environmental 
stocks (individual or aggregated) be maintained at every point in time or are they allowed 
to fluctuate temporarily? And perhaps the most important question: is sustainable 
development feasible and how should we go about attaining it? (see e.g. Opschoor, 1987; 
Van den Bergh, 1991; Kuik and Verbruggen, 1991; Klaassen and Opschoor, 1991). 
Answers to these questions determine the specific conditions of sustainable 
development. Even if sustainable development is reduced to 'the constancy of the natural 
capital stock', the implications for concrete, day-to-day policy decisions are still far from 
unambiguous. Economic analysis may contribute to this translation of the abstract to the 
specific by constructing environmental-economic scenarios with respect to specific policy 
interventions, conditional on specific assumptions regarding some of the questions above 
(Van den Bergh and Nijkamp, 1991). 
One of the questions which have been raised in recent years is how sustainable 
development and policies to foster it interfere with the process of trade liberalization 
which is pursued by most nations in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
and other multilateral or bilateral trade agreements. What are the links between interna-
tional trade and sustainable development? 
Environmental resource use is influenced by consumption and production decisions 
in an economy. These decisions are, in turn, inter alia influenced by consumption and 
production decisions in foreign economies through international trade. To study questions 
of environmental resource use in the real world, these economic linkages between 
of environmental resource use in the real world, these economic linkages between 
countries should be taken into account. Nijkamp and Verbruggen (1990) identify the 
following issues with respect to international trade: 
1. Because of international trade, environmental effects of extraction, production, 
consumption and waste disposal are shattered over different national states. This 
complicates the possibilities of integrated product-chain management. Source and effect 
become spatially separated and the effects in one part of the chain may therefore 
become 'invisible' to other parts. 
2. There may be tensions between on the one hand the pursuit of a free and competitive 
world economy through the abolition of tariffs and non-tariff trade restrictions, and on 
the other hand national environmental policies which increasingly employ standards, 
charges, subsidies, and licences. 
3. Many developing countries rely heavily on the export of primary resources. In general 
they have limited means, or have a low priority, to introduce effective environmental 
policies to ensure the sustainable exploitation of those resources. Because of their 
inability, or their low priority, to internalize negative environmental costs in their 
product prices, the result is over-exploitation of their environmental resources. 
International trade and sustainable development are interlinked, albeit in an indirect and 
often complex way. The main research (and policy) questions on this subject are: 
1. before addressing the links between trade and sustainable development, it should be 
made clear which interpretation of sustainable development is chosen and how this 
interpretation can be made operational, that is, how it can be measured. 
2. after this has been established, the question is whether and/or when international trade 
affects the possibilities (positive or negative) for sustainable development on a global, 
regional and local scale. 
3. if so, what are the main elements and mechanisms of their interaction, and 
4. if the interactions lead to tensions, what policy instruments should be used at what 
levels to make international trade and sustainable development compatible? 
2.2 International trade and the environment 
2.2.1 Theory of international trade 
The reasons for trade 
The fundamental reason for trade between countries is the existence of differences 
between countries: differences in resource endowments, conditions of production and 
differences in consumption preferences. In the absence of trade, the opportunity costs of 
producing goods may vary between countries because of these differences. Marginal 
opportunity costs measure the quantity of one good that has to be given up to produce an 
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additional unit of another good. In a two-country two-good example (say, the United 
Kingdom and Australia, both producing mutton and steel) the country with the lowest 
marginal opportunity costs of producing a good enjoys a comparative advantage in the 
production of that good and will export the good under free trade. For example, if 
Australia has to give up less steel production than the United Kingdom to produce one 
additional unit of mutton, Australia has a comparative advantage in producing mutton and 
will therefore export mutton under free trade. In this two-country two-good example, the 
United Kingdom must have a comparative advantage in steel production, and will export 
steel. 
Why do opportunity costs differ between countries? The well-known Heckscher-
Ohlin theorem states that if consumption preferences are identical in two countries, 
relative production costs will be determined by the relative factor endowments of the two 
countries given that goods are produced using factors of production in different propor-
tions or intensities. For example, if land is relatively abundant in Australia and labour is 
relatively abundant in the United Kingdom, Australia will specialize in land-intensive 
goods such as mutton and the United Kingdom will specialize in labour-intensive goods 
such as steel. Australia will export mutton and import steel and the United Kingdom will 
do the opposite. 
The Heckscher-Ohlin theorem provides a static framework for analyzing trade 
patterns. More recent approaches to the theory of international trade have stressed the 
dynamic aspects of trade. Dynamic aspects relate to changes in factor endowments, 
changes in demand patterns and one of the most important aspects: changes in technology. 
Technological change constantly introduces new products and improves production 
methods. Clearly, technological change is not spread equally among all countries. 
"Technology gaps" may therefore be an important source of comparative advantage and 
consequently of international trade patterns.1 
Although the theory of international trade has been advanced and extended in 
recent years, especially to take into account conditions of imperfect competition and 
increasing returns to scale (see below), the concept of comparative advantage has 
remained the cornerstone in the theory of international trade, and will be used as such in 
this report. 
The theory of protection 
Protection is the intervention of governments in markets of internationally traded goods 
and services in order to provide an artificial comparative advantage to a domestic industry 
vis-à-vis foreign competition (Gray and Walter, 1987). Protection discriminates between 
goods and services of different origins. The traditional theory of protection is cast in 
For reasons and consequences of technological change, see for example Dosi et al. (1990). 
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static partial- or general-equilibrium analysis; it shows a loss of global efficiency in 
resource allocation in the presence of trade discrimination. 
Government intervention of this type can take many forms, ranging from import 
tariffs to a host of so-called nontariff measures or barriers (NTMs or NTBs), including 
quotas, subsidies, voluntary export restraints (VERs), orderly marketing arrangements 
(OMAs) and administrative measures, such as licensing, government-procurement rules, 
technical standards, customs practices, and so forth. Some studies have listed as many as 
200 different NTBs (see e.g. Cassing, 1987). 
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Figure 2.1 The costs of protection 
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Figure 2.1 shows a partial-equilibrium diagram of the effects of a tariff or a quota on the 
domestic market. The foreign supply curve (SF), the domestic supply curve (SD), and the 
domestic demand curve (DD), determine a free-trade equilibrium with price A, consump-
tion T, domestic production S, and imports ST. 
A tariff shifts the foreign supply curve from SF to SF', thereby raising the market-
clearing price to B. Consumption falls to R, domestic production increases to P, and 
imports decline from ST to PR units. Consumers consume less and have to pay more. 
Their total loss (loss of consumer surplus) measures areas a,b,c and d. Domestic suppliers 
gain by the area a, the raise in producers' surplus. Government collects the tariff 
revenues, the area c. The difference between the gains and losses, the areas b and d, 
represent net losses (deadweight losses) to society. 
The effect of a quota, restricting imports to PR, is similar, except that area c does 
not go to the government, but is collected by the owner of the quota. Differences between 
tariffs and quota show up if one of the curves changes. Suppose that demand increases 
from DD to DD'. In the case of a tariff, the market-clearing price would remain constant 
at B and imports would rise to PU. In the case of a quota, imports stay fixed at PR, 
forcing the price to rise to C, which would add to society's losses. 
Additional economic losses of protection include the administrative costs of a tariff 
policy and the costs due to lobbying activities of protection-seeking domestic firms.2 
From the point of view of the individual industry, lobbying for protection may well pay-
off. In figure 2.1, area a depicts the potential increase in net revenue for the domestic 
industry due to the imposition of tariffs (in the case of quotas even larger revenues may 
be obtained). If the expected revenue exceeds the costs of lobbying, lobbying is profitable 
from the industry's perspective. However, resources spent on lobbying do not add to the 
national product, so they are wasteful from society's point of view. It should also be 
realized that positive rents in one sector may be accompanied by negative rents in 
another, for example if the other industry uses outputs from the protected industry, or if 
both industries compete for the same factors of production. 
The political economy of protection has devoted much attention to such rent-
seeking distortions. In general the argument goes that politicians may well be tempted to 
grant protection to lobbying industries as the benefits accrue to few, while the costs are 
spread over many and are therefore less visible and have less political force. 
There may also be reasons for protection that are perceived of being in the national 
interest. One classical example is that of national defence, whereby free trade may result 
in a too low a level of the domestic defence industry. The same argument often goes for 
agriculture, whereby free trade is feared to result in an inadequate level of self-sufficiency 
in food production. Other reasons for protection may be connected with income distribu-
Bhagwati (1988) calls these activities "directly unproductive profit-seeking" (DUP) activities. 
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tion, regional development, and so forth. Politicians may be inclined to trade-off 
allocative efficiency for these other benefits. 
Another set of arguments relates to essentially dynamic processes and focuses on 
adjustment costs. In a comparative static framework such as depicted in figure 2.1, 
adjustment costs are neglected. In a dynamic framework however, adjustment costs are 
real. Protection may be perceived as a means to smooth adjustment costs, both to 
developing industries ("infant industries"), as to declining industries. Again, agriculture 
provides an example of an industry where adjustment costs can be quite high (see e.g. 
Keyzer, 1991). 
Recognizing these arguments, economists have usually argued that border pro-
tection is not a very efficient tool to solve the above-mentioned problems. They have 
argued that targeted subsidies (although also trade disturbing) are less costly instruments. 
Border protection is not regarded as a first-best, or even second-best policy instrument. 
Trade policy can only be first-best (from a national perspective, never from a 
global perspective) if a country can improve its terms-of-trade at the expense of its 
trading partners. To be able to affect its term-of-trade by using tariffs, a country should 
have some monopoly power in trade and could therefore gain by restricting trade, just as 
a monopolist can increase its profits by restricting its sales. An extensive literature exists 
on the so-called optimum tariff. However, this policy is not without its dangers. The 
observation that 'any number can play this game', or the fear of retaliation by other 
countries has made an optimal tariff policy less attractive in practice. 
A more recent justification for trade policy has to do with what is called 'strategic' 
trade policy, in the case of competition between (a few) oligopolistic firms in different 
countries. In this case, government intervention can shift production and associated excess 
profits to one's own country by altering the terms of competition among firms in different 
countries, that is, by using trade instruments. However, Bhagwati (1991) points out that 
the precise intervention that will improve welfare depends critically on the nature of the 
strategic interaction between the firms. The information requirements for policy inter-
ventions seem very high. In addition, strategic theory usually neglects the possibility of 
retaliation by foreign competitors. 
A final argument for using trade instruments, or rather, threatening to use trade 
instruments, is to use them as a means to discourage unfair trade policies by trading 
partners. Countervailing duties and antidumping measures fall into this category. As such, 
a 'tit for tat' strategy may induce trading partners to cooperative behaviour. However, in 
practice it is very difficult to distinguish between 'fair' and 'unfair' practices. Several 
authors have expressed the fear that due to such difficulties, countervailing measures may 
be used as a pretext for purely protectionist purposes (Gray and Walter, 1987; Bhagwati, 
1988). 
In sum, government intervention in markets of internationally traded g*. ods and 
services in order to influence comparative advantages between countries usually results in 
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a loss of global efficiency in resource allocation, and often in a loss of national welfare as 
well. Even if there are good reasons to interfere with the free working of market forces, 
trade instruments are often considered to be second-best or worse. Even if trade instru-
ments are perceived as first-best, the danger is always present that they will be captured 
by protectionists' interests. 
2.2.2 Trade and environment 
International trade and the environment are interlinked in several ways. With the increas-
ing economic interdependence between countries and the increasing attention for interna-
tional and global types of environmental issues and solutions, the linkages become 
stronger and are increasingly perceived as potentially troublesome, either from the point 
of view of trade policy or from the point of view of environmental policy. The linkages 
between trade and environmental policies will be dealt with in paragraphs 2.2.3 and 
2.2.4. This paragraph sets out the fundamental linkages between trade and the environ-
ment in the absence of measures to internalize external costs in the prices of the traded 
goods. Four fundamental linkages are distinguished. They concern consumption, produc-
tion, transport and income effects, respectively. 
First, a country's environment may suffer if products are imported which cause 
particular environmental damage or risks (e.g. trade in hazardous wastes, pesticide-resi-
dues in foodstuffs). In this case, the environmental effect is linked to the consumption of 
the product. 
Second, trading countries specialize in those industries in which they have a com-
parative advantage. If these industries use relatively dirty production processes or deplete 
resources, the environments of the exporting countries will suffer. Alternatively, if a 
country's comparative advantage is in relatively clean industries, the environment will be 
less affected or might even gain. In this case, the environmental effects are linked to 
production. Such interactions with international trade have long been recognized. For 
instance, Siebert (1977) has constructed a case in which a country would be worse off 
under free trade than under autarky due to strongly negative external environmental 
effects in production. 
Third, trade needs transport. Transport uses energy and needs a physical infra-
structure. In general, international trade involves larger distances than national trade. 
Moreover, international transport does not fall within the jurisdiction of one government. 
This complicates the issue of government intervention to internalize external costs. Due to 
differences in taxation, energy prices in international transport are often lower than 
energy prices in national transport. 
Finally, international trade enhances economic growth of the trading partners. The 
relationship between economic growth and the environment is complex. On the one hand 
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growth may alleviate poverty-related environmental pressures and increase the possi-
bilities of a transition to sustainable production methods. On the other hand, without 
changes in technological and institutional patterns, growth will mean a mere perpetuation 
of present economic patterns and hence increase environmental pressures (WCED, 1987). 
To make an assessment of environmental impacts of (changes in) trade patterns, 
these fundamental linkages should be taken into account. Moreover, it is of particular 
importance to assess the situation "without" the (change in) trade. In other words, what 
would have happened if the (change in) trade had not occurred? For example, the EC 
demand for cassava from Thailand may have led to negative ecological impacts in the 
North-eastern part of Thailand. To make a total assessment of the impacts of changes in 
cassava trade it is very important to compare the economic and ecological developments 
between the actual case "with" and the hypothetical case "without" the change in trade.3 
It may also be important to assess the total life cycle of a product: from exploita-
tion of the primary resources, to intermediate products, final products, and waste 
disposal. All these stages may cause different environmental problems, and they may 
occur in different regions or countries, linked through interregional or international trade. 
Trade itself (the physical transport) may also be a cause of environmental pollution and 
degradation. 
A simple two-country economic-environmental model 
A model of the fundamental linkages between the economy and the environment is 
depicted in Figure 2.2. This figure, which has been adapted from Hafkamp (1983), shows 
a two-layer projection of reality on both an economic and an environmental layer. The 
layers contain economic and environmental sub-models. 
For reasons of simplicity, the economic sub-model exhibits only production and 
consumption. The goods that are produced in firms are sold to the consumers. Consumers 
supply labour and capital to the firms. In economic models, flows and stocks are usually 
expressed in monetary units. 
The environmental sub-model includes three extra variables: extraction, emissions 
and environmental quality. These variables are indicators of the state of the natural 
resource base on which the economic activities ultimately rest. 
3
 Bhagwati (1988) remarks in this respect that economists always worry about getting their counterfactual 
scenarios right. He cites an apocryphal story about an economist who, when asked "How is your wife?", replied: 
"Compared to what?". 
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Figure 2.2 Two-layer projection of an economic-environmental system 
The environmental sub-model shows that for the production of goods raw materials are 
extracted and are used in production. Pollutants are emitted as a side effect of extraction, 
production and consumption (including waste disposal). The emissions cause envi-
ronmental damage, which influences consumers and firms. In environmental models, 
flows and stocks are expressed in physical units. 
The fundamental difference between the economic and the environmental model is 
that the economic model is circular and the environmental model is essentially linear in 
nature. Non-renewable resources are extracted, transformed and consequently dispersed 
through the environment. In this respect, a connection with the second thermodynamic 
law of increasing entropy is often made. The regeneration of renewable resources may be 
threatened by over-exploitation and by environmental degradation. 
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Figure 2.3 Two-layer projection of a two-country economic-environmental system 
How does trade fit into this picture? Figure 2.3 depicts a two-country economic-envi-
ronmental model. The economic sub-model exhibits two countries (one country may be 
thought of as the rest of the world). A transport sector is added which forms the link 
between the two countries. The goods that are produced can be sold to domestic and 
foreign consumers and to foreign producers as raw material or as an intermediate good. 
The environmental sub-model shows that for the production of goods raw materials 
are extracted and are used in domestic production or, via transport, in foreign production. 
Firms can transport intermediate goods to each other. Goods are either sold to domestic 
consumers or, via transport, to foreign consumers. Pollutants are emitted as a side effect 
of production, transport and consumption (including waste disposal). The emissions cause 
environmental damage, domestic and/or abroad (transborder/global), which influences 
consumers and firms. The environmental sub-model assumes that consumers are not only 
affected by the environmental quality in their own country but also by the environmental 
quality abroad (by what is sometimes called 'psychological spillovers'). 
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2.2.3 Theory of environmental policy 
Environmental-economic theory has stressed the link between the lack of property rights 
to environmental resources and unsustainable resource use. Without clearly defined and 
protected property rights, no markets can arise to efficiently exchange the entitlements to 
the resources: from a welfare theoretical point of view, environmental problems are first 
and foremost a question of 'missing markets'. In a sustainable development context, the 
missing markets include the markets between present and future generations which are, of 
course, impossible to establish. 
The relationship between externalities and property rights was firmly established by 
Coase (1960) in his seminal paper. Coase has shown that where there is costless bargain-
ing between the generator and the victim of an externality, the outcome will be optimal 
whoever holds the property right. But of course, bargaining is not always costless, and 
this leads to the question under what circumstances it is efficient to create a market and 
when it is more efficient to address the externality differently. 
Consider the example of a traffic light. A traffic light is obviously not a very effi-
cient way to handle right of way situations. The red light may stop a business man who is 
in a terrible rush to make a billion-dollar contract. The green light may give right of way 
to a pensioner who is just making a pleasure trip without any hurry. If costless negoti-
ation could take place, the business man might easily bribe the pensioner into giving him 
right of way. This would provide an optimal outcome. However, it is obvious that the 
transaction itself would cost the business man more time than waiting for the red light. In 
this case, transaction costs prohibit the creation of a market, and the traffic light is not 
such a bad instrument anyway. 
From an economic point of view, market creation is probably the most efficient way 
to correct wasteful environmental resource use. However, excessive transaction costs may 
prohibit market creation. Alternative environmental policy instruments can be grouped 
into direct regulation (e.g. permits and standards), economic instruments (charges, sub-
sidies, deposit-refund, etc), and a broad category of pressure/persuasion, including volun-
tary agreements (convenants) between governments and industries (Opschoor and Vos, 
1989). The objective of these instruments is to internalize environmental costs so as to 
ensure that the full environmental resource costs of a product (in production, transport, 
use, waste) are taken into account in production and/or consumption. A problem in this 
context is: whose costs should be taken into account? Is it only costs of the present 
generation or also the costs of future generations (and who will determine those?) and, is 
it only the costs to the domestic population or also the costs of foreigners? 
A guiding principle in environmental policy is the Polluter Pays Principle (PPP), 
which has been adopted by the OECD in 1972. The OECD definition is: 
"the principle means that the polluter should bear the expenses of 
carrying out the [ ] measures decided by public authorities to 
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ensure that the environment is in an acceptable state. In other 
words, the cost of these measures should be reflected in the cost of 
goods and services which cause pollution in production and/or 
consumption. Such measures should not be accompanied by sub-
sidies that would create significant distortions in international trade 
and investment" (quoted in: Baldock and Bennett, 1992). 
An important goal of the PPP is to limit distortions in international trade: 
"the importance and merits of the Polluter Pays Principle fare] not 
only as an efficiency principle for the implementation of national 
environmental policies, but also as a principle which promotes the 
international harmonisation of these policies" (quoted in: Baldock 
and Bennett, 1992). 
The PPP is also a guiding principle for the environmental policy of the EC since the 
adoption of the Single European Act in 1986. However, its actual use has been limited, 
especially in the agricultural sector (Baldock and Bennett, 1992). 
Several authors have stressed the importance of all nations party to the GATT to 
accept the PPP as a guiding principle in their environmental policies (Arden-Clarke, 
1991; Verbruggen, 1991). Global adherence to the PPP would diminish tensions between 
trade and environment. 
However, a few observations have to be made on this subject. First, the PPP does 
not in any way prescribe the intensity or extent of any national environmental policy. Sec-
ond, the PPP assumes that it is possible to identify all polluters, that is, that some 
observed environmental damage can be traced back to a specific polluter who then may be 
held responsible. Experience has shown that this may be quite difficult in cases of histori-
cal or diffuse pollution, for instance in agriculture. Finally, the PPP may not be feasible 
in cases of transborder or global environmental problems. In these cases, international 
agreements should be sought in which alternative financial arrangements - side payments -
could well be justifiable. For example, Baumöl and Oates (1988) constructed a case with 
two countries and a transborder environmental spill-over in which the global optimum 
solution would be that the victim should pay (a solution which is sometimes called the 
Victim Pays Principle). 
2.2.4. Environmental policy and international trade 
How do environmental policy and international trade interact? As a starting point one can 
distinguish between, on the one hand, (1) environmental problems associated with produc-
tion (pollution as a result of a production process or depletion of natural resources) and 
(2) problems associated with consumption (pollution as a result of the consumption or the 
waste disposal of a product), and on the other hand, (1) domestic environmental problems 
20 
and (2) environmental problems which spill over to other nations or to the global environ-
ment. The four alternatives are depicted in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1: Four types of environmental problems 
domestic transborder/global 
process/production 11 12 
product/consumption 21 22 
Policies to address domestic environmental problems (11 and 21) may interact with trade 
in two ways: 
11] If the policy is meant to reduce environmental effects of domestic production, the 
competitiveness issue is often raised. Domestic producers may feel that they are 
being discriminated against foreign competitors who face less strict environmental 
standards; they may demand a "level playing field" (GATT, 1992). 
21] If the policy is meant to reduce domestic environmental effects of consumption, 
imports may face restrictions. Foreign exporters may feel discriminated and may 
challenge the trade restriction (e.g. Danish beer bottle dispute, US-EC hormones-in-
beef dispute). 
However, although environmental policy changes comparative advantages between 
countries, it should be realized that it essentially restores previous market failures 
regarding environmental externalities. In principle, environmental policies do not cause 
distortions, they correct distortions. However, industries may face adjustment costs as 
discussed in 2.2.1. Some government intervention to smooth these costs may be in order, 
but such intervention need not necessarily be in the form of border protection. 
Can trade instruments be used as substitutes for domestic environmental policies? 
The answer owes much to the theory of protection, discussed in section 2.2.1. Inter-
national trade per se is not a direct cause of environmental problems4: some distortion 
must be present - for instance the absence of an appropriate environmental policy - in 
order for international trade to create or worsen environmental problems (Anderson and 
Blackhurst, 1992). The first-best policy is to restore the market failure at its source by 
environmental policy at the national level, that is, by internalising environmental 
considerations in production and/or consumption decisions. For example, the manure 
problem in the Netherlands has been caused primarily by lack of environmental policies 
4
 Disregarding the environmental effects of (international) transportation. 
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restricting the use of environmental resources as a waste deposit. Restricting the imports 
of feedstuffs from foreign countries (e.g. tapioca from Thailand) is, at best, a second-best 
instrument, both with regard to efficiency and effectiveness. Similar to the arguments for 
protection in section 2.2.1 there may be reasons to interfere with the free working of 
market forces because of environmental side-effects. However, trade policy instruments 
are usually not first-best instruments. To counteract domestic environmental problems, 
trade instruments can therefore never substitute for environmental policies, they can only 
complement such policies. Clear rules for such usage of trade instruments should be 
established to prevent the capture of such instruments for protectionists' purposes. 
Many environmental problems have transborder or global repercussions, relating to 
pollution caused by production processes (12) or to polluting substances contained in 
products (22), or both. In this case international agreements with regard to production 
processes and product standards should be sought. If all countries participated in all 
international environmental agreements, there would be no trade distortions and no need 
for any trade measures. However, participation is often less than universal. Trade 
measures can then be used as "sticks" or "carrots" to encourage participation. Many inter-
national or multilateral environmental agreements have included trade provisions (17 up to 
mid-1991; see GATT, 1992: Appendix I). These trade provisions may regulate or ban 
trade (e.g. in certain types of endangered species) and usually discriminate against non-
signatories of the agreement. 
Environmental policy in one country may also wish to influence environmental 
pollution or degradation in other countries unilaterally, because of physical transborder 
spillovers (e.g. acid rain) or because of so-called 'psychological spillovers'. In fact, 
environmental policy makers may consider to use trade instruments (with respect to the 
product causing the problem or some unrelated product) to influence other country's 
environmental policies. This is a particularly sensitive area. The General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) does not allow such action (see below) and also the provisional 
Earth Charter (Article 12) discourages unilateral action of this kind. 
In reality, the distinction between 'domestic' and 'global/transborder' types of 
environmental problems (see Table 2) is not very clear-cut and may well change over 
time. Parallels may be drawn with the issue of human rights, an issue in which national 
sovereignty is increasingly being challenged by international rules. 
In principle, tensions between trade and environmental policies could be relieved if 
all trading countries would harmonize environmental policies, for example by complying 
to the Polluter Pays Principle. However, even if this would be agreed in principle, (large) 
differences in the intensities of policies and the types of instruments used between 
countries are likely to remain. The need for, and the priority given to environmental 
policy may differ substantially due to natural, socio-economic, and cultural differences. 
The playing field will never be flat: it may be very difficult to assess whether any 
remaining bumps and holes reflect genuine environmental tradeoffs - and therefore reflect 
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true comparative advantages - or just reflect economic shortsightedness. It is important to 
find and agree upon common environmental baselines in the international context. 
However, the same arguments hold for differences in socio-economic policies of the 
worlds' nations. These differences have at times put the relatively open post-war trading 
system under pressure, but somehow a modus vivendi has been established within the 
GATT. 
In sum, environmental policy and international trade interact on many counts. In 
principle, environmental policies correct previous market distortions ragarding envi-
ronmental externalities. In analyzing the linkages between environmental policy and 
international trade, a useful distinction can be made between, on the one hand, envi-
ronmental problems related to production and consumption, and on the other hand, 
domestic and transborder/global environmental problems. Tensions between environ-
mental policies and international trade exist, and may grow in importance as environ-
mental policy develops. The international community should develop clear rules and 
disciplines to make trade and environmental policies compatible and mutually reinforcing. 
2.2.5 International trade rules and environment 
The world's trading rules are laid down in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
The goal of this Agreement, presently subscribed by 105 countries, is to liberalize trade 
between nations party to the agreement. It does so by regularly negotiating reductions in 
tariffs and non-tariff barriers on a product-by-product basis in successive 'Rounds'. 
It is of particular interest to realize that the GATT operates on a "fixed rule" 
regime, rather than on a "fixed quantity" regime: if all members play by well-defined 
rules the members must expect the chips to fall where they may. The resulting allocation 
of industries and trade among member countries is derived of and legitimated by the 
approved process. This is in contrast to the "fixed quantity" regime that is inherent in 
"orderly market arrangements", "voluntary export restraints", etc. which aim to allocate 
trade volumes directly (Bhagwati, 1988). In intellectual approaches toward the problem of 
trade and environment, a distinction can also be made between those who concentrate 
primarily on the rules, and those who concentrate primarily on the outcomes of inter-
national trade. The rules and outcomes are of course interlinked, but essentially in a 
complex and partly unpredictable way. 
The rules of the GATT are concerned primarily with preventing discrimination, that 
is with limiting the extent to which countries can discriminate between home products and 
imports, between imports from different countries, and between goods sold in the home 
market and those exported (GATT, 1992). In certain cases, measures taken for environ-
mental protection purposes which would otherwise violate GATT obligations may be per-
mitted under Article XX of the GATT. This Article, especially subparagraphs b and g, 
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permits contracting parties to place health, safety and resource conservation goals ahead 
of non-discrimination, if certain conditions are met.5 One of the controversies around 
clause XX(g), which allows exceptions for trade measures which conserve exhaustible 
natural resources, is the "extraterritoriality" issue which relates to whether or not Con-
tracting parties can take measures to conserve resources outside their sovereign control 
(for different views, see for instance Sorsa, 1992 and Arden-Clarke, 1991). The GATT's 
position on this issue is presented below. 
In a recent Secretariat report, the GATT distinguishes three types of environmental 
policies which may influence trade, and states its position on these policies as follows 
(GATT, 1992): 
1. protecting the nation's own environment 
GATT rules place essentially no constraints on a country's right to protect its own 
environment against damage from either domestic production or the consumption of 
domestically produced or imported products. Generally speaking, a country can do 
anything it considers necessary to its own production processes. 
2. changing another country's environmental behaviour 
In principle, it is not possible under GATT to make access to one's own market 
dependent on the domestic environmental policies or practices of the exporting 
country. 
3. trade provisions in multilateral agreements 
In the first place the GATT Secretariat argues that in order to induce individual 
countries to join any agreement, positive incentives such as offers of financial 
assistance and transfers of environmentally friendly technology directly related to the 
problem at hand, as well as more broadly based offers, will be, in the long run, 
more effective than negative incentives such as discriminatory trade measures. In the 
second place, the GATT Secretariat states rather matter-of-facfly that "as long as 
participation in an environmental agreement is not universal, trade provisions will be 
[ ] discriminatory" (GATT, 1992: p. 36). 
5
 These conditions ensure that the trade measures are necessary for the achievement of the goals: that is, the 
goals cannot be reached with other measures and the measures are the least trade distorting way of achieving the 
goals. 
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3. INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT 
A sector where changes in trade and environmental policies will have far-reaching 
consequences is agriculture. World prices for agricultural products are highly distorted as 
a result of domestic policies in industrial and developing countries. Current agricultural 
practices lead to large environmental problems in industrial as well as developing 
countries. The present chapter reviews these issues. First, some recent developments in 
agriculture will be sketched, and the economic rationale behind these developments be 
discussed. Second, current agricultural policies and their impact on international trade will 
be outlined. A distinction will be made between agricultural policies in industrial and 
developing countries. Finally, attention will be paid to the most important environmental 
problems connected with agricultural production, and to the environmental effects of 
transport in agricultural products. Environmental externalities of agricultural production 
will be dealt with at great length, because international shifts in agricultural production 
resulting from changes in trade policies will have important environmental consequences. 
The environmental impact of changes in agricultural trade policies is one of the major 
policy issues that will be discussed in chapter 4. 
3.1 Economics of agricultural production 
An important part of agricultural production is directly related to the soil. Land is a 
scarce, immovable and not reproducible (within the period under consideration) unique 
natural resource (Breimyer, 1962). Clearly, this distinguishes the agricultural production 
process, as an economic activity, from the industrial production process. Because nature 
is an important factor of production, the volume of agricultural production is less control-
lable and predictable. It depends on difficult to influence natural surroundings (climate, 
rainfall, groundwater and soil quality). Furthermore, agriculture, as the dominant land 
use, largely determines the nature of the rural environment and can be held jointly 
responsible for the protection of environmental amenities such as wildlife, landscape 
quality, improved public access and, above all, variety. 
Agriculture in industrial countries is characterized by an increased demand for 
livestock products, a decline of prices paid for crops in real terms and increasing 
opportunity costs of farm labour. These developments affect output by encouraging 
farmers to produce more livestock products and to substitute cheaper production factors 
for labour. At the moment, livestock production in the industrialized countries exceeds 
crop production. The present system of feed supply has made feed grains constantly 
available at fairly well-stabilized prices. Furthermore, crop and livestock production are 
locationally wedging apart as a result of improved transport, increased commercial 
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preparation of mixed feeds and the need for, and premium on, specialized knowledge in 
livestock and crop production. The impact of agricultural market interventions on the 
process of separating crop and livestock production in industrialized countries has been 
tremendous. Through agricultural market interventions the farmer was assured at all times 
of a market for feedstuffs and livestock products. 
International comparisons of agricultural productivity show that the pattern of 
technological development in industrial (and other) countries differs markedly depending 
on whether a country has a large area of arable land and a small (declining) rural 
population, or whether it has a relatively large rural population and limited amounts of 
land. In countries with a high land-labour ratio, for example the United States, agricul-
tural productivity has been increased by using tractors, combines, and other forms of 
machinery primarily as substitutes for labour. In countries with a low land-labour ratio, 
such as Japan, the constraints resulting from limited land resource endowments were 
released by increasing the application of fertilizer, chemicals, and other yield-increasing 
inputs per unit of land (Hayami and Ruttan, 1985: Ch. 5). These findings largely explain 
the increased use of purchased inputs in the industrialized countries.6 By the increased 
use of purchased inputs industrial countries have been able to improve their output of both 
crop and livestock products substantially. 
In parts of the Third World, agriculture is still characterized by traditional farming 
practices. These practices have been developed without access either to scientific 
knowledge or industrially produced inputs. Land and labour productivity is low and 
unstable. The wide variability of yields is caused to a large extent by the limited control 
over soil moisture, pests and other cropgrowing variables (see e.g. Stevens and Jabara, 
1988: Ch. 4). 
In large areas of South and East Asia, some parts of Latin America and the 
Mediterranean region, and very few regions in Africa, agricultural systems have changed 
dramatically since the beginning of the 1970s. Agricultural productivity was boosted by 
the availability of new high-yielding varieties of rice, wheat, and maize, developed at 
international research institutes (the so-called Green Revolution). Adoption of these new 
varieties has a large positive impact on the profitability of using chemical fertilizer, 
pesticides, irrigation water and other complementary inputs. As a result, farmers' use of 
nonfarm inputs (including hybrid seeds) and investments in irrigation by farmers and 
governments greatly increased in these countries (Stevens and Jabara, 1988: Ch. 8). 
The Green Revolution did not have much impact on agriculture in most of Africa, 
and parts of Latin America and the Middle East. A number of explanations stand out. 
Purchased inputs are capital (consisting of investments in livestock, machinery and equipment, buildings, 
and management services) and variable inputs such as purchased feed (concentrates, forages, and milk replacer) 
and other intermediate inputs (fertilizer, pesticides, seed, gasoline and diesel fuel, veterinary services, contract 
work, electricity, etc.). 
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Firstly, the successful new technologies have been developed for a number of grains, 
grown primarily in temperate-zone agriculture. Many major food crops, like cassava, 
yam, sorghum, and millet, have received only limited attention. Secondly, the profitabili-
ty of new plant materials essentially depends on the availability of complementary inputs 
like chemical fertilizer and moisture control. In the semi-arid areas of Africa, Asia and 
Latin America, complementary moisture control greatly constrains the profitable use of 
these new technologies. Thirdly, government policies that tended to depress agricultural 
output prices in many countries in Africa and Latin America have made farmers reluctant 
to increase their output via new techniques. The next two sections will discuss recent 
agricultural policies, in industrial as well as less-developed countries, in more detail. 
3.2 Agricultural policies in industrial countries and international trade 
World trade in most agricultural products (intra-EC trade excluded) is less than 20 
percent of world agricultural production (Commission of the European Communities, 
1991: Table 3.6.5). For individual countries, the ratio of trade to agricultural production 
is to a 'irge extent determined by the size factor. Small countries are more dependent on 
international trade than large ones, since they are less able to produce the range of 
agricultural products they need. Hence, their ratio of trade to total production is high and 
their economies are fairly open. The diversity of agricultural conditions in large countries 
enables them to satisfy most of their own needs. 
The ratio of trade in agricultural products to total agricultural production is also 
influenced by some special features, described below, stimulating domestic agricultural 
production with the purpose to achieve self-sufficiency. Nevertheless, following the 
Heckscher-Ohlin theorem, resource endowments will provide a rough indication of the 
way in which international trade in agricultural products in the long run operates. 
Transportation costs are often disregarded in studies of international trade, although 
they may have a substantial impact on trade flows. The production costs of unprocessed 
agricultural products are generally low, because production is based to a large extent on 
the use of unpriced environmental resources. With a low value per unit weight transporta-
tion costs tend to be high compared to production costs, limiting (international) trade in 
unprocessed bulk products. In a further stage of processing, the ratio of transportation 
costs to production costs declines and international trade increases.7 Furthermore, 
transportation costs can be relatively high because many agricultural products are perisha-
ble. Consumption, either as a final consumption good or an intermediate good, is often 
7
 See e.g. Yeats (1977) for information on transportation costs for exports to the United States by product 
type and stage of processing. 
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confined to a limited period of time after harvesting. Storage and transport involved in 
transferring these products (e.g. by trucks or airplanes) are relatively energy-intensive. 
Most industrialized countries have well-developed agricultural policies to stimulate 
self-sufficiency and income parity for agricultural producers.8 As shown by Anderson 
and Tyers (1991), the nominal protection rates of grain, livestock products and sugar are 
positively related to a country's per capita income and significantly negatively related to 
its revealed comparative advantage in agricultural production. Because of these agricul-
tural policies, industrialized countries that protect agriculture export more and import less 
agricultural products than under a system that would be less protective to agriculture. 
This occurs at the costs of other sectors of the industrialized economies. 
Industrialized countries tend to protect those agricultural products for which there is 
an import need, where the price elasticity of supply is expected to be low, where the 
product is relatively cheap to store, and where the marketing channel can be controlled 
(Koester, 1985). If the price elasticity of supply is small for agricultural products and 
(related to that) the price elasticity of demand for inputs in agriculture is small, then the 
effect of agricultural protection on the rest of the economy is small and such a policy 
could induce an efficient redistribution of income in favour of farmers. However, some 
qualifications are needed. Agricultural policies have spillover effects to unprotected or 
less protected agricultural products. Furthermore, long-term price elasticities are much 
larger than short-term price elasticities, because technological development is partly 
induced by relative prices and because land, labour and capital respond only very slowly 
to price changes (see e.g. Hayami and Ruttan, 1985; Binswanger, 1990). Hence, the 
effects of agricultural policies on the economies of protecting countries and on interna-
tional trade in agricultural products will often not be small. For example, it has been 
estimated by Anderson and Tyers that during the period 1980-1982, prices on world 
grain, livestock and sugar markets were 14 percent below the equilibrium prices that 
would prevail without agricultural protection in the industrialized countries. Without 
agricultural protection, world trade volume would be more than 40 percent higher for 
meat and dairy products (Anderson and Tyers, 1991). 
Liberalising trade 
Removing barriers to trade in agricultural products in industrialized countries is an 
important issue in the now extended Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations. 
Because of the interdependence of consumption, production, resource allocation, and 
income, all sectors of an economy are linked, and the effects of a gradual lowering of 
agricultural protectionism will not be limited to the agricultural sector alone. To analyse 
the effects, an empirical model is required that should ideally include all the above-
See also figure A.7 for information on the protection of agriculture in selected developed countries. 
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mentioned linkages. Agriculture's share of GDP in most industrial countries is low, 
however, and relatively few people find employment in the agricultural sector. As a 
result, feedback effects may be small and analyses of the effects of liberalizing trade on 
world food prices, agricultural production, agricultural trade and welfare can be kept 
largely separate from modelling all sectors of an economy. Nevertheless, even in 
industrial countries like Canada, New Zealand, Denmark and the Netherlands, agriculture 
performs a very important role as a major export industry. Moreover, price changes of 
agricultural products have a substantial impact on incomes both within and outside the 
agricultural sector. The changes in expenditure patterns that result from these income 
changes will affect the sectors in an economy in a different way. When price changes are 
large, the magnitude of these changes may not be small. 
At the moment, a number of models exist that have been designed for analyzing the 
impact of agricultural trade liberalization on domestic and international markets. Each of 
these models differs from the others in structure, coverage of commodities and countries, 
and treatment of policies (see e.g. Blandford, 1990 for a review of up-to-date, multicom-
modity models of agricultural trade liberalization). Most of the models are partial 
equilibrium models. These models are designed for examining the impact of changes in 
policies regarding specific agricultural commodities with the remaining sectors of the 
economy not changing. As a consequence, these models focus on efficiency gains in the 
sector analysed, but not on the effects on incomes, relative prices and indirect efficiency 
effects (Goldin and Knudsen, 1990: p. 14). By contrast, general equilibrium models such 
as the IIASA-model (Parikh et al., 1988) examine the economy as a whole and the 
linkages between agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. These models allow the 
analysis of both efficiency and income effects throughout the economy. 
The discussion below will concentrate on a model developed by Anderson and Tyers 
(1989, 1991, 1992). This model has generated a substantial amount of published informa-
tion on the impact of trade liberalization.9 It has been used for evaluating the conse-
quences of recent proposals (made during the Uruguay Round's trade negotiations) for a 
phased, partial liberalization of agricultural trade. Moreover, the model outcomes have 
been used for exploring the potential effects of agricultural trade liberalization on the 
environment (Anderson, 1992a,b). Section 4.3 below will go into the environmental 
impacts of liberalizing (agricultural) trade. For understanding these impacts, it will be 
useful to discuss the main economic effects of agricultural trade liberalization first. 
In interpreting the results of this and other models on the same subject, Blandford 
(1990) has noted that existing models tend to overstate the impact of liberalization on 
protected agricultural sectors. In the long run, policy changes lead to changes in factor 
9
 It would be interesting to include the results of general equilibrium models in the analysis as well. 
Unfortunately, the available documentation on these models sharply contrasts with, in particular, the published 
information on the Anderson and Tyers model. 
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prices (particularly land prices) that will still keep much of agriculture in the developed 
world viable, even with lower domestic prices. Furthermore, once a sector is exposed to 
increased competition, technological advances, economies of scale, and productivity 
growth may be stimulated. Because these factors are usually not taken into account, the 
models probably provide an unduly pessimistic view of the survivability of agriculture in 
a less protected environment (Blandford, 1990: pp. 429-430). Similar arguments apply to 
the effect of trade liberalisation in developing countries. Changes in relative prices can 
have a profound effect on agricultural and non-agricultural incomes. In partial models, the 
demand effect of changes in non-agricultural income are usually not taken into account. 
Anderson and Tyers use a dynamic, multi-commodity simulation model of world 
markets for the major traded food staples, grains, livestock products and sugar (GLS 
model) to calculate the effects of liberalizing international trade in agricultural prod-
ucts.10 Their model differs from several other partial equilibrium models in its use of a 
dynamic framework, its incorporation of technological change and in exploring the effects 
of liberalization on price stability. Because a partial rather than a general equilibrium 
model is used, the true comparative advantage position of a sector cannot be measured. 
The measured effects are therefore incomplete. It is estimated that a phased 50 per cent 
reduction in protection in the industrial countries between 1991 and 2000 would cause the 
expected international prices of most grains, livestock products and sugar to be higher 
than would otherwise be the case (Anderson and Tyers, 1992). The largest price change 
is for dairy products (an increase of more than 30 percent by the late 1990s). 
The results of other models also indicate that world market prices of the major 
temperate-zone agricultural commodities would increase if existing protective policies 
were removed. The general consensus is that dairy product prices would increase most, 
while the change in the price of grains would be modest. Most of the models suggest that 
the volume of trade would increase if trade was liberalized. As in the case of price levels, 
large increases are foreseen in the trade of dairy products (and meat), while increases in 
the volume of trade in grain would be modest (Blandford, 1990: pp. 414-417). 
The outcome of the GLS-model indicates that the effect of partial liberalization on 
domestic food production is, compared to the reference scenario, less dramatic than is 
often feared in protectionist countries. Although resource allocation within the agricultural 
sector in one region and over regions changes, total production would be about the same 
compared to what it would otherwise have been. Total production in the EC-12 would be 
no more than 3 percent below the base scenario level by 2000. Production of nonruminant 
meat in Western Europe would be considerably higher with liberalization because 
feedgrain prices would be lower. Only for Japan, the estimated production differences are 
10
 Seven commodity groups are distinguished: wheat, coarse grains, rice, meat of ruminants, meat of non-
ruminants, dairy products and sugar. These groups account for about half of world food trade, most of the rest 
being edible oils and beverages. 
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larger. Japan's production in the partial liberalization scenario is on average one eighth 
below the base scenario's production level by the year 2000 (Anderson and Tyers, 1992: 
Table 2). 
Because of productivity growth, the absolute level of production in industrial coun-
tries expands considerably (even in Japan) despite the steady lowering of protection 
levels. By the year 2000, the volume of the EC's output of GLS products would be one 
fifth larger than in 1990. The gross value of food production would be affected by not 
only the output effect but also the effect on prices. For the EC-12 the effect of liberal-
ization, compared to the reference scenario, by the year 2000 is a 24 percent decline of 
the overall value of food production (Anderson and Tyers, 1992: Tables 3 and 5). Under 
these circumstances a sharp decline of the total number of fanners is expected, resulting 
in a limited effect on farm income (Tims, 1990). 
Estimates of the economic welfare effects associated with partial liberalization 
indicate that industrial market economies would be substantially better off. The gains of 
consumers and taxpayers in these countries are only partly offset by the losses that 
confront producers. Producers in the traditional food exporting countries among the 
industrial countries gain because of higher prices for their exports in the liberalization 
scenario. Industrial countries as a group would be more than 35 thousand million 1985 
US dollars per year better off by the turn of the century, or $ 45 per capita (Anderson 
and Tyers, 1992). Other studies generally agree on the direction of the welfare effects of 
freer trade. Industrial countries would gain through a net increase in economic surplus 
(defined as the net sum of transfers among producers, consumers, and taxpayers). The 
models show, however, considerable variation in the size of transfers among producers, 
consumers and taxpayers (Blandford, 1990: pp. 421-426). 
The IIASA-model (Parikh et al., 1988) attempts to provide information on the effects 
of liberalization for the whole economy. This model suggests that the gross domestic 
product of virtually all industrial countries would increase by a small amount as the result 
of agricultural trade liberalization. In countries with highly protective policies, such as 
Japan and the European Community, the gain in the nonagricultural sector would 
outweigh the losses in agriculture. Consumption of all commodities would increase, and 
trade would become a much more significant proportion of national income (Blandford, 
1990: pp. 426-428). 
3.3 Agricultural policies in developing countries and international trade 
In contrast to the industrialized countries, many less-developed countries have tended to 
discriminate against agriculture in recent decades. According to the World Bank (1986), 
agriculture has been taxed implicitly as well as explicitly in the past. Implicit taxation 
resulted from macro-economic policies aimed at promoting industrial activity (by means 
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of tariff protection, quotas, subsidies, public investment, etc.) and from overvalued 
exchange rates. Explicit taxation of agriculture took the form of export taxes on agricul-
tural products, marketing boards extracting high margins from buying and selling 
agricultural products, and so on. Figure A.8 gives an indication of the extent to which 
industrial protection has lowered the relative profitability of agriculture in a number of 
developing countries. The relative protection coefficients show the extent to which value 
added in agriculture has been protected relative to value added in industry. Except for 
Korea, all countries in the sample discriminated against agriculture. The discrimination 
was highest in Nigeria and Colombia (relative protection coefficients smaller than 0.5). 
One of the outcomes of these policies has been an unfavourable internal terms of 
trade for agricultural products. Protection of industry has resulted in high prices for 
consumption goods and agricultural inputs from this sector. Furthermore, regulation of 
agricultural markets, taxation and overvalued exchange rates have depressed the prices for 
agricultural products. 
The lack of developmental interest in the agricultural sector not only caused a worse-
ning of the internal terms of trade, but also had a negative impact on agricultural 
development policy (structural policy). Investments in agricultural research, rural 
infrastructure, education and extension, institution building and other so-called public 
goods were generally insufficient for establishing a fast-growing, transforming agricultural 
sector. 
The discrimination against agriculture is very much a result of development strategies 
that promote domestic industries with the intent to produce locally the goods that 
previously were imported. Such strategies are intended to accelerate the shift of resources 
out of agriculture by lowering its profitability compared with that of industry. To ensure 
the economic survival of import-substituting factories, it was necessary to adopt policies 
that made imported goods more expensive or more difficult to acquire. 
Since the beginning of the 1980s, structural adjustment programmes have been 
adopted in many less-developed countries in order to confront an economic downturn. 
One of the major goals of most structural adjustment programmes is to stimulate the 
production and export of agricultural products. To this end, improvement of the internal 
terms of trade for agricultural products, adjustment of the real exchange rate, and an 
increase of the productivity and efficiency of agriculture are commonly pursued. The 
measures that are taken differ from country to country, but common elements in most 
adjustment programmes are price liberalization (including exchange rate adjustment), 
reduction of government interference, promotion of the private sector, and removal of 
quantitative and administrative trade controls. 
Empirical models of agricultural production and trade may be used for examining the 
impact of agricultural policy changes in developing countries on production, consumption, 
trade and economic welfare of different world regions or countries. Anderson (1992a,b) 
used the GLS-model for examining these effects. Contrary to other partial equilibrium 
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models on the same subject (including previous versions of the GLS-model), the model 
addresses not only direct policy distortions, but indirect discrimination against agriculture 
(via protection for manufacturing and overvalued exchange rates) as well. Using this 
model, a reference simulation for 1990 is compared with a simulation of what food 
markets could have looked like in 1990. In the alternative scenario, food price distortions 
in industrial as well as developing countries are assumed to be absent. The latter scenario 
assumes that complete adjustment to the new (long-run) equilibrium occurs instan-
taneously. Although this assumption is unrealistic, the extreme results are useful because 
they indicate what world agriculture might have looked like in 1990 if distortions would 
have been absent for a decade or two prior to that year. The results of the alternative 
scenario have been used by Anderson (1992a,b) for exploring the effects of agricultural 
trade liberalization on the environment. Section 4.3 will discuss these environmental 
effects. 
It should be emphasized that the alternative scenario differs considerably from the 
scenario discussed in the previous paragraph based on the proposal made during the 
Uruguay Round's negotiations for a phased 50 percent liberalization in industrial countries 
only between 1991 and 2000.n The eventual long-run effect of liberalization is less easy 
to see from such a dynamic simulation than from the comparative static simulations 
reported in this section (Anderson, 1992b: p. 158). 
The model outcomes of the comparative static simulation indicate that international 
food prices would almost be the same (minus one percent) on average as forecast in the 
reference scenario when both industrial and developing countries liberalize. The effect of 
lowering protected prices in rich countries is offset by the recovery of depressed food 
prices in poor countries when the discriminatory policies against agriculture are removed. 
The price effects differ considerably across commodities. Prices of dairy products rise 
substantially (84 percent), whereas the prices of nonruminant meat, sugar and coarse 
grain show modest declines in the second scenario. 
As regards production effects, Anderson (1992a,b) considers the effects on three 
(ecologically important) commodity groups only. These are grains, ruminant meat and 
sugar. The most striking result is that total world food production hardly changes as a 
result of the reforms. When industrial as well as developing countries liberalize food 
trade, world production of grain would decrease by 2.8 percent, whereas production of 
sugar and beef and sheepmeat would increase by 4.2 and 4.4 percent, respectively. To 
some extent, the decline in grain production occurs because liberalization of trade in meat 
and diary products implies that less grain feeding and more grazing of pastures would 
11
 Anderson (1992a,b) also presents results of a long-run, comparative static simulation with protectionist 
food policies removed in industrial countries only. The results are comparable to those of the phased partial 
liberalization scenario discussed in the previous section. Only the magnitude of the changes, in particular the 
production declines in Japan and the EC, is much stronger in the comparative static simulation. 
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occur globally. The estimated production changes are even smaller when liberalization 
would take place in industrial countries only. 
Although total world food production hardly changes, large regional shifts in food 
production would occur. When developing countries as well as industrial countries would 
liberalize their policies, production of the three commodity groups would decline most in 
Western Europe and Japan (where the declines range from 25 to 84 percent), whereas 
production in North America and East Asia (excluding China) would decline as well. 
These declines are more or less balanced by production increases for all three commodity 
groups in Latin America, China and Sub-Saharan Africa. 
3.4 Environmental effects of agricultural production 
Technological and biological developments, presumably to some extent caused by 
agricultural protection, have steadily enabled farmers in industrial countries to improve 
the productivity of individual crop and livestock activities. Chemical inputs, new varieties 
of crops and animal breeds, advisory and veterinary services, product specialization, more 
continual cultivation and larger scale systems are main contributors. In places, previously 
infertile, waterlogged, or otherwise marginal lands have been brought into production 
(Green, 1991). To many observers these improvements of productivity have become 
increasingly open to question. External effects of the existing production technology and 
also of the scale and intensity of production have been kept outside productivity analysis. 
A narrow focus on increased productivity has obscured the fact that there have been high 
environmental and social costs to agricultural progress. 
As discussed above, environmental externalities are evidence of market imperfections. 
In the context of agriculture, environmental problems reflect the price system's inability 
to achieve the socially optimal land allocation among various uses/farming systems. 
Primary concerns in industrial countries are water pollution from applications of pesti-
cides and fertilizers, and air pollution by ammonia, nitrogen oxide, etc. More explicitly, 
environmental externalities of agricultural production mainly caused by increases in 
agrichemical input use are (see e.g. Van der Stee, 1989): 
- Environmental pollution by phosphates; the application of phosphates to the soil 
exceeds the withdrawal of phosphate by crops. As a result the buffer capacity of the 
soil has declined. Eventually, the quality of surface water declines as leakage to 
groundwater increases. 
- Environmental pollution by ammonia; deposition of ammonia not only leads to 
acidification, but also to undesirable fertilization of the soil. It is also an important 
source of air pollution due to smell. 
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- Environmental pollution by nitrates; nitrogen in fertilizer or manure is only partly 
used by crops. Due to leaking to groundwater and washing to surface water, nitrates 
reduce the quality of drinking water and harms the natural vegetation. 
- Environmental pollution by insecticides, pesticides, herbicides, etc.; the use of 
chemicals in crop production threatens the quality of ground, surface and drinking 
water. Also, they harm animal organisms and influence the ecological equilibrium. 
These environmental problems related to intensive input use are primarily of a domestic 
nature, although there may exist some physical spillovers to adjacent countries. Intensive 
use of chemical inputs like pesticides and fungicides may also cause consumption-related 
externalities when large residues of these chemicals are present in food that is being 
consumed. When food containing such residues is exported, this may affect the health of 
people in the importing countries. 
Changing farming systems created a demand for resource policies with respect to a 
wide range of natural resources, including forestry resources, fisheries, minerals, 
groundwater, and soil. Of equal importance is the loss of wildlife habitat and landscape 
features due to the restructuring of agriculture. The concern is with changes in both 
quantity and quality of the resources over time. For example, intensive modern agricultu-
ral production in industrial countries has led in some places to deterioration in soil 
structure, water and wind erosion and to salinization (Green, 1991). Transport of minerals 
has led to shortages in some places and surpluses in others. Changes in farm landscapes 
are widely regarded as detrimental to the scenery of the countryside and its use for public 
recreation. Countries such as the Netherlands, Germany and Britain have long had 
arrangements for management agreements wherby farmers are paid to farm in ways which 
maintain the environmental value of their land. 
In developing countries, the use of chemical inputs in agriculture is much lower on 
average, and so are the problems related to intensive use of these inputs. But there exist 
large differences between countries and regions. As discussed above, productivity 
increases during the Green Revolution were partly a result of increased use of chemical 
inputs. In densely-populated areas in Asia, the use of such inputs has reached levels 
similar to those of industrial countries. For example, FAO-estimates indicate that 
fertilizer use in China and the Republic of Korea in 1989/90 was equal to 262 and 425 
kilograms per hectare of arable land, respectively. The corresponding figures for 
Denmark, France, and the Netherlands are 250, 319 and 642 kilograms. In Sub-Saharan 
Africa, on the other hand, average fertilizer consumption is less than 9 kilograms per 
hectare of arable land (World Bank, 1992: Table 4). 
The most threatening environmental problem in developing countries, however, is 
the deterioration and loss of arable land. Several types of soil degradation can be 
distinguished. The importance of each type differs greatly from region to region. The 
main aspects of soil degradation are erosion, nutrient depletion, and salinization and 
waterlogging. 
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Erosion is a key component of soil degradation, characterized by irreversibility and 
off-site effects. Although erosion is a problem for temporate soils as well (for example in 
the United States), its impact on aggregate agricultural production is much larger in 
tropical countries. Tropical soils, rainfall and agricultural practices in the latter countries 
are more conducive to erosion. For countries such as Mali, Costa Rica, Mexico and 
Malawi, estimates of economic losses due to gross soil loss range from 0.5 to 1.5 percent 
of Gross Domestic Product annually (World Bank, 1992: pp. 55-56). 
Erosion can have important positive or negative off-site effects, depending on where 
the eroded soil ends up. On the one hand, it may harm productivity by deposing silt in 
dams, irrigation systems and rivers and by damaging fisheries. On the other hand, eroded 
soil may add to agricultural land elsewhere. As such, it represents a geographical shift in 
agricultural productivity. Off-site effects of erosion can evidently have an international 
dimension, like for example in the case of Nepal and Bangladesh. 
A related problem is that of nutrient depletion. Maintenance of soil fertility requires 
a balance between nutrient losses (through uptake by crops, livestock raising, erosion, 
leaching, and so on) and nutrient replacements (through manure, chemical fertilizer, crop 
residues, and so on). If over a period the balance is negative, this indicates that nutrients 
are being mined from the soil. As a result, agricultural production takes place at the 
expense of future generations. When losses exceed nutrient gains, application of chemical 
fertilizer can help to restore the balance. 
Soil nutrient depletion is a major problem in large parts of Sub-Saharan Africa (see 
e.g. Stoorvogel and Smaling, 1990). African farmers have exhausted their soils for a long 
time. Traditionally, lack of fertilization was compensated by long fallow periods. Increas-
ing pressure on land due to population growth and farm size increases has eliminated the 
recovery period, or considerably reduced its length. Soil depletion has been the inevitable 
outcome of this process (Van der Pol, 1992). In addition, population pressures have 
increased demand for firewood. The resulting removal of tree cover has important effects 
on the nitrogen contents of the soil (and on soil erosion by wind and water). As more and 
more people turn to dung and straw for cooking, the natural cycle of soil replenishment is 
further disrupted (Pomfret, 1992: p. 205). 
Salinization and waterlogging have become growing problems in certain irrigated 
areas in recent years. Irrigated land is detoriating in many countries, partly as a result of 
bad management practices. According to Repetto, over 20 million of hectares in India and 
Pakistan have been lost through waterlogging, and at least 30 million are seriously 
affected by salinization (Repetto, 1989: p. 76). Salinization is not just a problem of 
irrigated land. Most of it occurs naturally. Globally, nearly one-third of arable land is 
affected by elevated salt concentrations (World Bank, 1992: p. 57). Except for the 
potential cross-boundary effects of soil erosion, most types of soil degradation typically 
have domestic effects. 
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A problem with an entirely different dimension is that of deforestation. Cutting of 
(tropical) forests can have a number of undesirable ecological effects of a global nature. It 
may contribute to the loss of genetic diversity of timber species and to the potential 
extinction of plants and animals. As trees sequester carbon as they grow, deforestation 
reduces the absorption of carbondioxide from the atmosphere. On the other hand, forests 
protect and enrich soils, affect local and regional climate and have various other ecologi-
cal effects on a local scale (World Bank, 1992: pp. 57-58). 
The clearance of land for agricultural purposes can be an important source of 
deforestation. But rarely only one source is responsible. Data from the World Resources 
Institute, presented by Anderson (1992a), suggest that tree felling for firewood is 
responsible for about 80 percent of wood use in developing countries. Commercial 
logging has a minor contribution only. Once cleared for firewood, marginal land is often 
used for food production purposes (Anderson, 1992a: pp. 164-165). According to the 
World Bank (1992: p. 58), tree felling for fuel purposes is concentrated in tropical dry 
forests and nonforest wooded areas around dense human settlements in Africa and South 
Asia. Tropical moist forests, on the other hand, are mostly being lost to agricultural 
settlements (roughly 60 percent of annual clearing), especially in land-scarce countries. 
Finally, it should be noted that trade in agricultural products may also involve 
considerable environmental externalities. Transport of unprocessed agricultural products 
takes place at relatively high financial as well as environmental costs, because transport of 
these products is relatively energy-intensive. Similarly, the transportation of more pro-
cessed agricultural products often causes substantial environmental externalities, such as 
high C02 emissions, because of the perishable nature of these products. Examples are the 
international transportation by airplane of kiwis, eggs, and flowers. The environmental 
effects of transport are often overlooked in studies of trade and the environment (see e.g. 
Anderson, 1992a,b; GATT, 1992). More research is needed on means of transporting 
agricultural products and C02 emissions per type of transport in order to verify the 
aforementioned assertions. 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed a number of features of domestic policies, trade and environ-
mental problems specific to the agricultural sector. It has shown the large extent to which 
the global pattern of agricultural production is determined by domestic policies. Together 
with a country's specific comparative advantages, these agricultural policies considerably 
influence trade volume and trade directions. As a result, world market prices for a 
number of agricultural products are highly distorted compared with domestic prices in 
many countries. 
Agricultural production in developing and developed counties causes a number of 
specific environmental problems, primarily related to the use of land and industrial inputs, 
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that differ from environmental problems in other sectors of the economy. These problems 
are predominantly of a domestic nature (erosion, soil mining, water and air pollution, 
etc.), although there do exist some physical spillovers to adjacent countries (including 
consumption-related externalities). Agriculture also contributes to global problems like the 
greenhouse effect (for example through land clearance). Moreover, trade in agricultural 
products may cause considerable (transport-related) externalities, since it mainly involves 
bulk products and perishable products. The nature of the relationships between produc-
tion, trade, and the environment therefore differs considerably as between agriculture and 
other sectors in an economy. Models of relationships between production, trade and 
environment should take these intersectoral differences into account in order to provide a 
solid basis for policy decisions. 
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4. MAJOR POLICY QUESTIONS 
To examine the various issues of international trade and the environment systematically, a 
theoretical analysis of sustainable development, international trade, and environmental and 
trade policies was developed in chapter 2. Using the proposed analytical framework, some 
major policy questions with regard to international trade and the environment will now be 
examined in more detail. 
Environmental policies are discused in the first two sections of this chapter. 
Adoption of (theoretically sound) environmental policies will generally lead to changes in 
trade flows, as the correction of previous market failures will change comparative 
advantages between countries (see section 2.2). The introduction of environmental policies 
also raises a number of questions regarding a country's competitiveness, international 
harmonization of environmental standards and measures, and the potential role of trade 
measures. For analytical purposes, domestic environmental effects will be distinguished 
from transborder or global environmental effects. Section 4.1 will examine consequences 
of national environmental policies for international trade, while section 4.2 is devoted to 
international environmental problems and the related use of trade measures. 
Another important policy issue is the impact of trade and trade liberalization on the 
environment. As discussed in section 2.2 above, free trade maximizes national and global 
welfare provided environmental externalities are corrected through appropriate policies 
(and a number of standard assumptions on the functioning of markets are satisfied). These 
corrective policy measures should be such that the social costs of production for export 
are taken into account by producers. 
However, for various reasons governments often adopt policies that intervene with 
free trade. Moreover, until now corrective environmental policies have infrequently been 
undertaken. Section 4.3 therefore examines the potential impacts of trade liberalization on 
the environment. The emphasis will be on trade in agricultural products because of the 
importance of agriculture in current GATT-negotiations. For a brief review of current 
agricultural policies and environmental problems related to agriculture the reader is 
referred to chapter 3. 
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4.1 Consequences of national environmental policies for international trade 
Domestic environmental problems can in principle be resolved by purely domestic policy 
choices. These choices are made on the basis of various considerations and priorities. 
Different countries have different natural resources, different natural conditions, and 
different environmental assimilative capacities. Furthermore, the priority given to 
environmental quality differs from country to country. Poor countries generally attach 
lower priority to environmental quality than rich countries do. 
There is general agreement in the literature that, in the case of national environ-
mental problems, international harmonization of environmental standards is neither 
necessary nor desirable (see e.g. Verbruggen, 1991; GATT, 1992; Subramanian, 1992). 
Comparative advantage is based on the existence of differences between countries: 
differences in resource endowments, production conditions (including technology), and 
consumption preferences. The gains from trade or international specialization derive from 
this difference. The environment is one element of possible differences between countries. 
In the eyes of domestic producers, differences between countries in environmental 
policies are often regarded as unfair, because they give rise to differences in 
competitiveness. Lower standards abroad regarding pollution are perceived as detrimental 
to competitiveness. Political pressures to lower the standards at home or to eradicate any 
trade created by the differences in standards are the logical culmination of this line of 
thought. However, when the environmental problems are strictly domestic, the differences 
in policies are properly regarded as domestic choices reflecting, among other factors, the 
domestic trade-offs between income and the environment. Seen in this way, the differ-
ences in costs of production due to differences in standards can well be an additional 
source of gainful trade among these nations as are any number of other natural advantages 
(GATT, 1992: pp. 28-29). 
It is also important to recognize that in principle there is no difference between the 
unfair competition argument regarding environmental standards and arguments that could 
be advanced for remedial action against lax population policies, large expenditures on 
education, policies encouraging capital formation or the immigration of skilled labour, or 
other policies influencing competitive advantage (GATT, 1992: p. 29; Subramanian, 
1992: p. 141). Subramanian concludes that where there are no physical spillovers, there 
ought to be a serious presumption against the use of trade restrictive action - be it in the 
form of contingent protection action (e.g. countervailing or anti-dumping duty), competi-
tive subsidization, or attempts to harmonize pollution standards (Subramanian, 1992: p. 
142). 
On the other hand, Verbruggen (1991: p. 690) argues that there may conceivably be 
cases of national environmental problems in which international harmonization would 
- " b e desirable. He mentions the case of international trade in hazardous wastes as 
an example.12 Furthermore, it may not be easy in practice to make a clear distinction 
between national and international environmental problems. Rather there is a continuum 
ranging from local environmental problems (e.g. noise) through transfrontier problems 
(e.g. acid rain) to global problems (e.g. climatic change). Despite these complications, 
the general principle of non-harmonization of standards regarding national environmental 
problems is commonly accepted in recent literature. 
Although international harmonization of standards should generally not be pursued 
in the case of domestic environmental problems, harmonization of the form of environ-
mental policy (principles and measures) is highly desirable. As discussed in section 2.2, 
the importance of the Polluter Pays Principle (PPP) as a guiding principle in national 
environmental policies has often been stressed. Global adherence to this principle would 
diminish tensions between trade and the environment. 
What will be the impact of environmental regulation on trade? When a country 
unilaterally introduces environmental policy, comparative advantage in the production of 
the damage-intensive good moves in favour of its competitors. When the country is small, 
production will decline and foreign exchange earnings will be reduced. A large country 
which is a net exporter will enjoy an increase in its terms of trade, because the world 
price rises. Cost increases will be passed on to the importing countries. In general, 
however, the introduction of environmental measures will shift resources from regulating 
to non-regulating countries. The flow is often from industrial countries to low-income 
countries which then become the home of the world's pollutive industries and a market 
for restricted chemicals and drugs. In the long term this can create problems in the non-
regulating country. First, regulating countries may gain from the development of 
environmentally-friendly technologies and products. Secondly, when resources degrade 
and productivity decreases in the non-regulating country, competitiveness will ultimately 
decline. Whether or not such effects will occur, depends of course on the natural 
conditions and the environmental assimilative capacity in the non-regulating country. 
Thirdly, when resources degrade and productivity declines elsewhere, the regulating 
country may eventually re-gain comparative advantage in the long run. 
How strong is the impact of environmental regulation on the relocation of produc-
tive activities? Empirical studies generally show that cost differences due to differences in 
environmental regulations are relatively small. A number of studies show that even in the 
most pollution intensive industries, pollution abatement costs constitute only between one 
and three percent of total industry costs (see studies cited in Subramanian, 1992: p. 142). 
There is some evidence of cross-border relocation by firms in response to differences in 
environmental policies, but the evidence (viewed on a world scale) certainly does not 
suggest massive investment relocations (GATT, 1992: p. 31). Reduced environmental 
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costs abroad are often counterbalanced by other considerations, such as labour availability 
and quality, wage rates, supporting infrastructure, tax incentives, market size, transport 
costs, and country risk. Moreover, investment expenditures induced by environmental 
policies may increase future competetiveness on the expanding market for environmental-
ly-related goods and services (GATT, 1992: p. 31). 
A different issue arises when the consumption of an imported good causes pollution 
or affects health and safety. It is only reasonable that these goods are subjected to the 
same taxes or regulations as the domestic versions since the externalities arise from the 
consumption of the products (rather than their production) and therefore is independent of 
where they were produced (GATT, 1992: pp. 32-33).13 Import restrictions are a proper 
tool to enforce domestic consumption bans or domestic standards. For example, a ban on 
domestic smoking would also require the prohibition of imported cigarettes, and compli-
ance with domestic emission standards would require a ban on cars not fitted with the 
apropriate catalytic converter (Subramanian, 1992: p. 150). 
A related issue concerns the consumption of an imported good whose production 
affects the local environmental quality abroad ('psychological spillovers').14 One recent 
example is the dispute over imports into the United States of Mexican tuna that did not 
meet the US dolphin protection standards. The GATT panel found that a contracting party 
should not be permitted to take trade measures to enforce its own laws regarding animals 
or natural resources outside its jurisdiction. If it would be accepted, then any country 
could ban imports of a country merely because the exporting country pursues environ-
mental and health policies different of its own. The panel upheld, however, the United 
States law regulating labelling of tuna products as "Dolphin Safe" (GATT, 1992: pp. 26-
27). The use of labelling requirements constitutes a less controversial approach to these 
problems, as it allows consumers the freedom to exercise their preference against eco-
unfriendly processes or products if they wish so (Subramanian, 1992: p. 150). 
4.2 International environmental problems and trade measures 
When there exist transborder or global physical spillovers, trade interventions are 
tempting instruments for dealing with these problems. In principle, however, the choice 
13
 Trade disputes over health and safety standards are more likely than disputes over policies dealing with 
consumption pollution because of the inexact nature of their scientific evidence and other reasons (GATT, 1992: 
p. 33). The U.S.-E.C. dispute over the use of growth hormones in beef provides a good example. 
14
 In some studies, the impact of domestic consumption on the threatening extinction of species of animals 
(or plants) that live (grow) abroad is also called a 'psychological spillover' (see e.g. Blackhurst and Subramani-
an, 1992). Since the extinction of species is essentially a global environmental problem (to be discussed in the 
next section), this type of psychological spillovers is not considered here. 
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of the appropriate intervention to correct the market failure is independent of whether the 
problem is domestic or international. The optimal instrument for a problem is the one 
among the list of feasible instruments whose base is most closely related to the source of 
the market failure. Thus, trade-based instruments are generally second-best instruments to 
correct the environmental failure relative to production- and consumption-based instru-
ments. In very few cases is international trade in commodities the actual cause of an 
environmental problem (Lloyd, 1992: pp. 67-69). 
The difficulty with policies aimed at abating transborder or global environmental 
problems, however, is the absence of a supranational enforcement authority. National 
jurisdiction and sovereignity has to be respected. The enforcement of environmental 
policy stops at a nation's border. Cooperation of other countries can be secured on a 
voluntary basis only. Inter-governmental cooperation is essential to finding a solution. 
Both efficiency and equity considerations must be addressed as part of such a solution. 
Efficiency issues arise when costs of abatement differ from country to country. 
These differences should be taken into account in order to minimize the global costs of 
reducing environmental damage. The contribution of each country to the solution of the 
problem should vary inversely with the costs of abatement. Equity issues arise because a 
country's contribution to the globally efficient clean-up effort may not match either its 
share of the pollution being emitted or its ability to pay. Securing multilateral cooperation 
will not be easy in such situations (GATT, 1992: p. 34). 
Maler (1990) characterizes international negotiations on environmental problems as 
a game in which those who gain from cooperation must devise rules so that countries that 
would otherwise lose have an incentive to agree to play the game. He concludes that there 
will be many situations where the Victim Pays Principle (VPP), i.e. transfers from the 
country whose environment has been degraded to the country that degrades the environ-
ment, will be necessary in order to achieve an efficient solution. The transfers will give 
the losing countries an incentive to cooperate. Adherence to the Polluter Pays Principle 
(PPP) would lead to the non-cooperation of these countries and the collapse of the game. 
According to the GATT (1992), positive incentives are the best way to achieve 
sustained inter-governmental cooperation when such cooperation is not voluntarily 
forthcoming. Positive incentives can include offers of financial assistance and transfers of 
environmentally friendly technology directly related to the problem at hand, or (more 
broadly based) offers to increase foreign aid, to lessen debt problems and to make non-
discriminatory reductions in trade barriers. Negative incentives - in particular, the use of 
discriminatory trade restrictions on products unrelated to the environmental problem at 
hand - are not an effective way to promote cooperation. Given the justifiable basis for a 
diversity of environmental standards among countries, it is important to minimize the risk 
of solutions being imposed (through their greater economic or political power) by the 
larger or richer countries. Furthermore, by generating resentment and commercial 
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frictions, negative incentives reduce the prospects for inter-governmental cooperation on 
future problems (GATT, 1992: pp. 21, 36). 
The debate over deforestation and global warming may be used to illustrate some of 
the issues (GATT, 1992: pp. 34-35). It is generally accepted that reducing C02 levels 
involves both reduced C02 emissions and action to slow or reverse deforestation, but 
opinions differ as to which approach to emphasize. One way of viewing the situation is 
that growing forests provide carbon absorption services to a world that is dumping 
increasing amounts of carbon into the atmosphere. Since countries that have a high ratio 
of (growing) forests to domestic carbon emissions are not paid for exporting carbon 
absorption services to the rest of the world, they have little incentive to take such services 
into account when deciding how to use their forests. The result is most likely a faster rate 
of deforestation than would otherwise occur. Rather than being threatened with restric-
tions on their exports, it seems logical that these countries are offered compensation for 
exporting carbon absorption (and biodiversity) services. 
It should be noted that resource transfers themselves will affect global environ-
mental quality, since income levels and environmental quality are highly correlated. For 
example, resource transfers to low-income countries may reduce poverty-induced 
environmental degradation in these countries (Subramanian, 1992: p. 148). 
Although trade measures should generally not be used for correcting market failures 
that create environmental problems, trade measures can play a role in the promotion and 
enforcement of international cooperation on environmental issues (see e.g. Verbruggen, 
1991; GATT, 1992; Subramanian, 1992). Trade sanctions (involving products that are not 
related to the problem; mostly increased import restrictions) or trade provisions (appli-
cable to problems directly related to the problem) may be used to induce countries to 
participate, when it has been established that some countries are truly free-riding, or to 
enforce and sustain multilateral agreements. Trade provisions are generally such that non-
participants are at a disadvantage. Their primary purpose is to prevent the agreement 
from being undermined by non-participants (Blackhurst and Subramanian, 1992). 
What will be the impact of multilateral environmental agreements on international 
trade flows? It is difficult to draw some general conclusions, since the resulting changes 
in trade flows clearly depend on the precise contents of the agreement in question and its 
implementation. When a tax is introduced on a specific environmentally damaging 
commodity, the profits made by producers of the good will decrease and/or the price paid 
by users will rise (depending on the prevailing market conditions). The volume of 
international trade in the environmentally damaging good will generally decline. Other 
potential elements of multilateral agreements can have either a direct (e.g. trade sanctions 
or trade provisions) or indirect impact (e.g. side-payments to compensate losing countries) 
on the pattern of international trade in products related and unrelated to the problem at 
hand. Quantitative models that decribe the relationships between the most important 
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components of a multilateral agreement and international trade in related and unrelated 
commodities are needed to assess the resulting impacts. 
4.3 Impact of trade liberalization on the environment 
The potential impact of trade liberalization on environmental degradation has been highly 
debated in recent years. On the one hand, environmentalists often claim that if production 
or consumption of a good has negative environmental effects, then the expansion of world 
output of that good following trade liberalization would lead to greater environmental 
degradation (assuming no changes in environmental policies or production methods). In 
addition, the increase of trade flows will intensify transport-related externalities. On the 
other hand, it has been claimed by others (predominantly economists) that trade liberaliz-
ation will often benefit the environment. For example, the GATT (1992) argues that there 
is no reason to assume that growth of per capita income (boosted by expanding trade) 
necessarily, or even on average, damages the environment, because increases in per 
capita income provide more resources to contain environmental damage and make people 
better aware of the need to devote resources to the environment. Moreover, the better 
trade opportunities facilitate the implementation of environment-improving processes, and 
trade in recycled inputs can help countries economize on resource use (GATT, 1992: pp. 
19-20). Other proponents of trade liberalization argue that liberalization reduces pressure 
on resources, since countries will tend to specialize in those goods that use relatively 
abundant factors of production (Heckscher-Ohlin model), and that income increases 
alleviate poverty-related environmental pressures and induce a transition to sustainable 
production methods. 
When environmental policies of trading partners are such that environmental 
externalities are corrected in an appropriate way, trade liberalization will increase national 
and global welfare. However, despite their desirability from a welfare-economic point of 
view, first-best environmental policies may not be adopted for a variety of reasons (see 
e.g. section 2.2). Instead, governments often rely on second-best or third-best policies or 
do not address certain environmental problems at all. The discussion on the environmental 
impact of trade liberalization mainly focuses on situations where appropriate environ-
mental policies are lacking. No simple, unequivocal answer can be given with regard to 
the impact of trade liberalization in such situations. Besides the arguments mentioned 
above, an analysis of this question should take into account the effect of income increases 
on technology and commodity mix, and should distinguish between the different life cycle 
stages of a product. 
The income increase and relative price changes that result from trade liberalization 
are likely to induce changes in production technologies. In the absence of appropriate 
environmental policies, effects of such technology changes on the environment can be 
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positive or negative. In addition, income increases resulting from trade liberalization will 
change the composition of consumption and production. Externalities related to consump-
tion and production differ greatly from commodity to commodity. The resulting environ-
mental impact of income increases is therefore difficult to assess. 
It is also important to distinguish between the life cycle stages of a product. Imports 
of manufactures and processed agricultural goods in industrial countries generally face 
much higher tariff barriers than imports of unprocessed raw materials (see e.g. Balassa, 
1968; Yeats, 1977). As a consequence, most processing industries are located in high-
income countries. Reduction of tariff barriers is likely to induce a relocation of processing 
industries towards countries that are rich in natural resources, and to change considerably 
the pattern of trade in processed and unprocessed products. Evidently, this will have a 
major impact on the environment of the countries involved. 
Empirical models are clearly needed to assess the overall impact of the various 
direct and indirect effects of trade liberalization on environmental degradation. Empirical 
estimation of the different counteracting effects is needed to appraise the direction and 
magnitude of the relationship (see also Lutz, 1992). With respect to agriculture, some 
recent studies have used the outcome of economic models of agricultural trade liberaliz-
ation as a benchmark for assessing potential environmental effects (see Anderson, 
1992a,b; Lutz, 1992). Using the long-run, comparative static version of the GLS-model 
(see chapter 3 above), Anderson argues that the international relocation of cropping 
production from high-priced to low-priced countries would reduce substantially the use of 
chemicals in world food production. Increased chemical use in countries with relatively 
low producer prices is more than offset by lower applications of chemicals that result 
from production declines in high-priced countries. The underlying reason is that empirical 
data suggest an exponential relationship between the price of farm output and the use of 
farm chemicals per unit of output (Anderson, 1992b: pp. 162-163). The global reduction 
in chemical use would occur all the more so because most of the countries where 
production expansions are concentrated tend to be relatively sparsely populated;15 the 
consequent lower price of land in these countries is assumed to result in less farm 
chemicals per unit of output than in relatively densely populated countries at identical 
farm output prices (Anderson, 1992b: pp. 163-164). 
The relocation of meat and milk production from intensive grain-feeding enterprises 
in densely populated rich countries to pasture-based enterprises in relatively sparsely 
populated poorer countries is another factor associated with lower use of chemicals such 
as growth hormones and medicines for animals. The shift to less bought-in feeds would 
also reduce the problems associated with animal waste disposal in developed countries. 
Besides reducing air, soil and water contamination by farmers, the greater use of less-
15
 A notable exception to this general tendency is China. 
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intensive production methods would also reduce the chemical intake by the world's food 
consumers on average. Food consumers in densely populated Western Europe and Japan, 
where price and trade policies and high land prices currently encourage the heaviest use 
of farm chemicals and the most intensive methods of feeding, would have the most to 
gain from the effect of such reforms (Anderson, 1992b: p. 164). Increases in transport to 
urban consumption areas resulting from the shift in production to sparsely populated 
countries, and the concomitant worsening of environmental problems, like C02 emissions, 
are not included in Anderson's analysis. 
Anderson also considers environmental externalities related to primary factors of 
production. Although primary production factors are much less responsive to price 
changes than variable inputs, they do respond over the longer term. A slowdown in the 
flow of labour to urban areas as a result of higher agricultural prices would reduce urban 
environmental problems, especially in developing countries where that labour is employed 
in smokestack industries. Land clearance for agricultural purposes may contribute to 
deforestation. Available empirical evidence cited by Anderson (1992b: p. 166) indicates, 
however, that land area is by far the least responsive factor to changes in farm output 
prices. Moreover, the negative impact of price liberalization is likely to be small 
compared with the negative impact of inadequate enforcement of forest property rights 
and of tax incentives and subsidy policies which encourage felling to promote agricultural 
and mineral development projects. And in any case the negative impact of trade liberaliz-
ation has to be weighted against the reforestation on former farm land in industrial 
countries that liberalize agricultural trade and the environmental effects of foregone 
production in other sectors of developing countries where resources would otherwise have 
been employed (Anderson, 1992b: pp. 164-167). 
According to Lutz (1992), the responsiveness of production factors in developing 
countries to agricultural price changes depends on farm size. The response of large farms 
is very significant, while the response of small farms is comparatively small and inelastic 
for all factors of production. In developing countries with a commercial farm sector, 
increased agricultural prices will therefore result in more intensive resource use and 
associated negative environmental effects of that subsector. Increased absorption of farm 
labour by the commercial sector could potentially have some off-setting positive effects if 
the labour otherwise would be farming marginal areas and extending the frontier, but the 
impact is unlikely to be large (Lutz, 1992: pp. 85-86). 
Negative environmental effects in developing countries could also partially be offset 
via the income effect of higher prices. Higher incomes permit farmers to use production 
techniques that are more environmentally benign and to make some additional conserva-
tion-type investments that increase long-term productivity. In the view of Lutz, these 
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potentially positive effects are expected to be small,16 but empirical work should be 
undertaken to determine these (Lutz, 1992: pp. 86-87). 
In his conclusion, Lutz holds that higher world agricultural prices lead to economic 
benefits for developing countries, but the associated environmental effects are expected to 
be negative; however, because of positive off-setting effects, this cannot be concluded 
unambiguously without empirical examination. In Lutz' opinion, Anderson's (1992a,b) 
conclusions about the results of food trade liberalization are somewhat more positive, and 
he stresses Anderson's point that a removal of distortions on farm prices could and should 
be accompanied by the introduction of more optimal environmental policy instruments 
including the removal of any farm input subsidies, or policies to discourage deforestation 
(Lutz, 1992: p. 87). As a general proposition, trade liberalization should not only never 
be cancelled for environmental reasons, but its benefits can be enhanced if appropriate 
environmental measures are taken at the time of liberalization (Anderson, 1992b: p. 168). 
Recalling the discussion of environmental effects of agricultural production in 
chapter 3, a number of remarks on the outcome of these studies can be made. First, no 
distinction between environmental effects for different groups of developing countries is 
made in these studies. In Sub-Saharan Africa and other regions where the Green Revol-
ution did not have much impact thus far, use of chemical inputs is at very low levels. 
Taking into account the low estimates of (long-term) supply response found in empirical 
studies for Sub-Saharan Africa and other low-income countries (see e.g. Chhibber, 1989), 
higher farm output prices are unlikely to cause significant problems due to intensive use 
of these inputs within one or two decades (or even longer). On the contrary, since 
farmers are mining their soils in large parts of Africa, increased use of chemical fertilizer 
may in fact contribute to restoring the nutrient balance in these countries. 
Second, higher export prices may induce farmers in developing countries to shift 
from food crops towards export crops. Such a shift may have important but complicated 
environmental consequences, because the amount of environmental damage varies 
markedly by type of crop. For example, increased export production enhances soil 
nutrient depletion (since minerals are taken from the soil and exported abroad), but in the 
case of perennials the continuous soil cover provides obvious ecological advantages 
compared to annual food crops. In the United States erosiveness is relatively high for 
cotton and soybeans and relatively low for wheat and rice. Fertilizer and pesticides 
requirements also differ considerably from crop to crop (Reichelderfer, 1990: Table 1). 
Third, increased trade aggravates transport-related environmental externalities. As 
discussed in chapter 3, environmental effects of transport may be relatively high for a 
number of agricultural and food products. Empirical models of the environmental effects 
Repetto (1989), on the other hand, stresses the negative impact of depressed output prices on farmers' 
investments in soil conservation in his plea for eliminating market distortions. 
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of agricultural liberalization should be able to distinguish all these effects if they want to 
provide a realistic description of the most important mechanisms in force. 
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5. ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF TRADE IN SELECTED COMMODITIES 
Four cases are presented in this chapter of commodities whose production and interna-
tional trade involves important environmental externalities. The case studies are primarily 
meant to illustrate the various theoretical and policy questions with regard to international 
trade and the environment discussed in the previous chapters. Rather than an in-depth 
analysis of particular commodities, the four cases emphasize the relation to the analytical 
framework provided in this study and the trade and environmental policy dilemma's 
involved. Tropical timber (section 5.1) and grain and grain substitutes (section 5.2) are 
selected in view of the study's focus on international trade in primary (agricultural) 
products. The other two cases, energy resources (section 5.3) and hazardous wastes 
(section 5.4), illustrate several other aspects of the links between production, trade and 
the environment. 
5.1 Tropical timber 
Tropical timber is an example of a commodity whose production involves global 
environmental externalities. Moreover, international production and trade patterns are 
significantly distorted by trade barriers. A lively discussion has been going on recently on 
proposals to reduce the cutting of tropical forests, including proposals for trade bans and 
other measures restricting trade in tropical timber. Tropical timber therefore provides an 
interesting case for comparing recent literature regarding its trade and environmental 
aspects with the general theoretical analysis of the previous chapters. 
Deforestation affects the environment in a number of ways. Tropical forests, in 
particular tropical moist forests, are very rich in species of plants and animals. Tropical 
plants contribute important genetic materials for plant breeders and underlie many 
pharmaceutical products. The removal of tropical forests is likely to result in an important 
loss of endemic species. Deforestation in tropical areas also contributes to soil degrada-
tion through erosion, laterization, and other processes. Large parts of the soils underlying 
the remaining tropical forest are infertile and easily degraded if the vegetative cover is 
removed. Because of high temperatures and rainfalls, nutrients in the soil quickly deplete 
(Repetto, 1988: p. 14). Forests also function as CO, sinks, since they sequester carbon as 
they grow. For this reason, and because a substantial part of the increase of C02 results 
from burning wood and forests, deforestation is an important contributor to the green 
house effect (see e.g. Mather 1990: pp. 202-204). 
Commercial logging is one of the factors responsible for deforestation in tropical 
countries. Gillis and Repetto (1988) argue that industrial country trade barriers against 
wood products have been partially responsible for inappropriate investment and patterns 
of exploitation in Third World forest industries. In order to protect wood manufacturing 
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industries, industrial countries typically have set tariffs much higher on imports of 
processed wood products than on logs. Faced with the anti-processing effect of these trade 
barriers, log-exporting countries have banned log exports, reduced or waived export taxes 
on processed wood, and offered substantial incentives to forest product industries in an 
effort to stimulate investment in domestic processing capacity. While the net effect of 
these conflicting trade policy measures has been to restrict world consumption somewhat, 
severe distortions in investment patterns and losses in economic efficiency have also 
resulted. 
In industrial countries, labour and capital have been retained in declining industries. 
Many industrial countries are both importers and exporters of forest products, tend to 
import relatively unprocessed products and to add value to these in industries developed 
initially on the basis of domestic wood production (Mather 1990: pp. 153-156). In 
developing countries, the protection provided to wood-processing industries has been so 
high as to weaken competitive pressure and to undermine incentives to minimize costs. 
An example of the latter are the low recovery rates from logs in heavily protected timber 
processing activities. As a result of these inefficiencies in production, demands on natural 
forest endowments have intensified. In principle, however, domestic processing of logs 
offers substantial potential savings in shipping and manufacturing costs, since processing 
considerably reduces the weight of the raw material. Countries with forest resources and 
low labour costs clearly enjoy comparative advantages in forest-based industries. 
On the basis of these considerations, Gillis and Repetto (1988) argue that reduced 
tariff escalation and non-tariff barriers to processed wood imports from developing 
countries will result in a gradual transfer of most tropical wood-processing industries to 
countries with large forest endowments. Reduced protection and a more competitive 
environment for wood processing in developing countries can be expected to result in 
substantial modernization and improved efficiency of existing processing industries. 
Hence, in this case both developmental and environmental goals can be served by trade 
liberalization. 
This conclusion is, however, subject to a number of qualifications. First, the 
analysis by Gillis and Repetto is essentially a qualitative one, based on a number of case 
studies for major timber-exporting developing countries. No quantitative assessments of 
the impact of trade liberalization on the rate of deforestation are made. Second, although 
the study considers the impact of processing on shipping costs, the implications of 
changes in the structure of trade flows on total energy consumption in transport are not 
examined. Third, opinions differ widely on the extent to which commercial logging 
actually contributes to the process of deforestation. According to the World Bank (1992: 
p. 58), tree felling for firewood and land clearance for agricultural purposes are more 
important contributing factors in developing countries, although tropical moist forests in 
East Asia have been exploited most for its timber by logging companies. In this context, 
it is interesting to consider the results of a model for production and trade of tropical 
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timber in Indonesia (Jepma and Blom, 1992). The model outcome indicates that the 
introduction of import quotas by developed countries or export quotas by developing 
countries does not or at most hardly affects deforestation processes. However, other 
policy options, such as reducing population pressure or raising agricultural productivity, 
seem capable of substantially mitigating the trends towards progressive tropical forest 
degradation. 
Deforestation is a typical example of a global environmental problem. International 
consensus is recently emerging on the desirability of sustainable use of tropical forests. 
For example, the International Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA) is the first interna-
tional commodity agreement that has included sustainability among its goals. During the 
1990 meeting of the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) it was decided 
that by the year 2000 all traded tropical timber should be produced in a sustainable way. 
Important disagreements exist, however, on the measures that have to be taken at 
the international level to achieve these goals. The Government of the Netherlands intends 
to foster timber imports by 1995 from those countries or regions that have adopted 
forestry policies aimed at conservation and sustainable production. Although the impact of 
this unilateral measure on deforestation will be small, the Dutch Government obviously 
intends to promote the desirability of rational forest management. It is recognized, 
however, that lower prices resulting from import restrictions may cause reactions that 
conflict with the intended goal. Increased tree felling in order to maintain incomes and 
foreign exchange earnings at previous levels may be one of the consequences (Ministerie 
van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij, 1991: pp.45-46). 
The European Parlement has adopted a resolution regarding trade in tropical timber 
in 1989. The purpose of the proposal is to stimulate sustainable management of forests in 
producer countries. Agreements should be reached through bilateral or multilateral 
negotiations. Import quota on tropical timber will be an element of such agreements. In 
addition, imports of tropical wood products from countries that do not participate in forest 
management and conservation programmes will be banned. 
Malaysia is the main proponent of the view of the tropical timber-exporting 
countries. In their view, industrial countries that have destroyed their own natural heritage 
now want to control the use of relatively undamaged resources in developing countries. 
Malaysia recognizes the importance of tropical forests for the preservation of biodiversity 
and the absorption of C02. But tree felling is of vital importance to the country's 
economy, because land is needed for agricultural purposes and for accommodating the 
growing population, and because wood exports provide an important source of income. 
Instead of boycotting tropical timber imports, industrial countries are expected to 
compensate countries that reduce deforestation for the economic losses involved. In 
addition, industrial countries can make positive contributions to the deforestation problem 
by paying higher prices for tropical wood produced in a sustainable way, by closing 
inefficient farms and polluting industries, and by reforestation of the resulting idle land. 
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The GATT Secretariat is also opposed to trade restraints on tropical timber for 
environmental reasons on a number of grounds (GATT, 1992). Total timber exports 
amount to less than one percent of the trees felled in developing counties, so the impact 
on deforestation will be very small. Moreover, through lowering the price of tropical 
timber, a ban would reduce the incentive to protect existing forests and establish new 
ones. And because half the world's traded timber comes from tropical countries, attention 
needs to focus on forest management in developed countries, too. If deforestation is 
considered undesirable, then countries that reduce the rate of exploitation should be 
compensated, i.e. paid for the carbon absorption and biodiversity services they provide, 
instead of being threatened with restrictions on their exports. But perhaps the most 
effective way to slow down deforestation is to promote employment and income growth in 
timber-exporting counties, for example through economic policy reform at home and 
access to markets abroad (GATT, 1992). 
In conclusion, studies on the impact of the structure of protection in trade of wood 
products on the process of deforestation show that both developmental and environmental 
goals can be served by trade liberalisation. However, many qualifying factors play a role, 
and future studies may greatly benefit from the use of quantitative models. Such models 
should incorporate the impact of land clearance, tree felling for firewood and other causes 
of deforestation. Attention will also have to be paid to the institutional context in which 
deforestation takes place in terms of property rights, resource management, and the 
ability to enforce conservation measures. Moreover, an extension of the analysis to 
environmental problems related to transport in logs and processed wood products is 
desirable. 
As regards the ongoing discussion on the use of trade restraints for reducing 
deforestation, it can be concluded that the arguments presented in favour of international 
compensation payments and against the use of trade measures accord well with the 
theoretical arguments presented in chapters 2 and 4. Moreover, the impact of trade 
measures on deforestation is likely to be much smaller than the impact of compensation 
payments (and economic policy reforms), because international trade in timber makes 
only a minor contribution to deforestation. 
5.2 Grain and grain substitutes 
Grain includes wheat, rice, barley, corn, rye, oats and other cereals. Grain is an 
important product in food and feed. Because of a highly adaptive capacity, grain can be 
produced under very different climatologie circumstances and cultivation practices. Crop 
prospects are normally speaking good, although accidental factors may influence the 
annual production volume. Grain is cultivated in all regions of the world: in developed 
countries like North America, Europe and Australia and, using much simpler cultivation 
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practices, in less developed countries in Asia and Africa. Important differences in 
productivity do exist between regions and countries. Most governments in developed 
countries stimulate production and influence trade in grain by market regulations.17 By 
stimulating technological change, production of grain in and export of grain from the 
developed countries increased sharply. These developments also caused environmental 
problems. 
Grain is easy to store. This increases the possibility to trade and transport grain 
over large distances. Grain is the most important agricultural product on the world market 
measured in monetary terms. The ratio of trade to production differs from almost 20 per 
cent for wheat (highest) to less than 3 per cent for rice (lowest) (Silvis and Van Berkum, 
1990). 
World grain trade increased rapidly during the seventies. World grain import in 
1980 was about 220 million tons, almost twice as much as in 1970 (Van Berkum, 1992). 
An indication of the increases in world grain import is presented in table 5.1. The 
(former) Soviet Union increased their grain import demand from 2.8 million (metric) tons 
in 1970 to 43.7 million (metric) tons in 1981. Income and population growth also caused 
significant increases in import demand by less developed countries, especially in North 
Africa and the Middle East. The United States increased their share in world export of 
grain from an average of 39 per cent in the period 1970-73 to an average of 50 per cent 
in the period 1978-81. Here, the possibilities to increase production, by bringing formerly 
unused land into production, were to a great extent available. Other traditional exporters 
like Canada, Australia and Argentina also increased their export. Under its Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP), providing a stabilized internal market for grain, the EC shifted 
from a net import into a net export position. By 1990, the EC share in world export of 
grain was nearly 21 per cent. More detailed analysis at the world, continental and country 
level about the composition and fluctuations in grain production and trade can be found in 
Oskam (1991). 
World trade in grain stabilized after 1980. Trade in grain was affected by increased 
domestic production, a slow-down of economic growth and the shortage of hard currency 
in the importing countries (Silvis and Van Berkum, 1990). Also, up to 1985 the price of 
grain on the world market increased because of the appreciation of the dollar. 
Grain price policies of the industrial countries have supported the increased export 
of grain to the developing countries. The current position of nations on the world grain 
market is determined by the rapidly increasing productivity in the industrial countries. In 
the latter, production per hectare increased at a much higher rate than in developing 
countries (Anderson and Tyers, 1991). Productivity growth in the industrial countries 
17
 See section 3.2 for reasons of agricultural protection in the developed countries. 
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Table 5.1: Export and import of grain for selected countries, 1970-1990 (million metric 
tons) 
Export 
United 
States 
EC-9 
Canada 
Australia 
Argentina 
Import 
USSR 
Japan 
China (incl. 
Taiwan) 
EC-9 
World im-
port 
1970 
40.4 
17.5 
14.9 
8.4 
10.2 
2.8 
15.6 
6.4 
34.9 
110.8 
1975 
74.1 
25.9 
15.6 
11.3 
8.2 
16.7 
18.8 
5.8 
37.6 
156.4 
1980 
112.9 
33.1 
21.8 
19.5 
9.9 
31.2 
24.5 
17.1 
31.5 
218.9 
1981 
113.4 
37.2 
22.8 
13.3 
18.4 
43.7 
24.4 
18.4 
30.6 
233.1 
1989 
108.3 
52.0 
16.6 
13.1 
7.1 
38.8 
27.4 
22.2 
26.5 
236.1 
1990 
92.6 
54.6 
23.1 
14.8 
10.4 
32.9 
27.0 
19.9 
26.7 
225.2 
Source: Oskam (1991) and FAO (1990) 
resulted mainly from increased use of chemical and mechanical inputs, of which the EC is 
a clear example. The transition of the EC from a net importer of grain into a net exporter 
during the last decade, can be considered a result of intensive use of purchased inputs, 
enabling farmers to improve production per hectare (Blom, 1990). Intensive use of 
purchased inputs have negative environmental externalities (see also section 3.4). As 
chapter 2 points out, trade-related measures to correct for these environmental externali-
ties may not be as efficient as production- and consumption-related measures. 
The impact of the observed grain trade flows on the development of the agricultural 
sector in developing countries depends on two questions: (1) does it depress the grain 
market in the developing countries and (2) how do domestic producers respond to changes 
on the domestic grain market (Van Berkum, 1990). There is no unambiguous answer to 
these questions. Although consumers in developing countries gain from a low grain price 
on the world market, incentives to producers in the developing countries to expand grain 
production are low. This might have negative as well as positive environmental effects. 
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Grain substitutes 
It is not very clear which products are covered by the term "grain substitutes". Winterling 
and Tangermann (1987) accept the definition of the EC-Commission. This definition 
covers all products which are supposed to replace grain in compound animal feed; 
cassave, (wheat) bran, cornglutenfeed, maize germ meal, citrus pellets, dried grain and 
molasses. Grain substitute imports in the EC increased from 7.4 million tons in 1970 to 
an maximum of 18.4 million tons in 1982 (Winterling and Tangermann, 1987). 
Ever since 1980 the EC-9 has been a net-exporter of all grains, where it has been a 
net exporter of wheat ever since 1974. Due to the CAP, the internal price of grain is 
much higher than world market price. Export subsidies are needed to make export to the 
world market possible, which puts high pressure on the EC budget. Problems of financing 
the EC budget started discussions as how to fight surpluses on EC grain markets as early 
as the end of the seventies (Winterling and Tangermann, 1987). Grain producing 
countries in the EC, especially France, hold the rising import of grain substitutes respon-
sible for the surpluses on the EC grain market. However, even before the EC grain 
market had developed into a surplus situation, the EC grain price policy had induced the 
import of grain substitutes by its high grain price relative to the world market. The 
competitivenes of grain substitutes on the EC market depends on the ratio of the EC grain 
price to the world market grain price. Also, grain substitutes would not be competitive 
when trade restrictions like tariffs and import quotas would be used to increase the 
internal price of grain substitutes. However, part of the grain substitutes is not covered by 
market regulations and can be imported at relatively low world market prices. The 
increased livestock production in the EC, especially the increased intensive livestock 
production in the Netherlands, started to use increased shares of the cheap and imported 
grain substitutes. 
The growth of intensive livestock production in the Netherlands, based on imports 
of grain substitutes, causes animal waste surplusses. Mineral losses from manure have 
affected environmental quality. The negative external effects of minerals are: accumulati-
on of phosphates in soil, groundwater and surface water, emissions of ammonia, perco-
lation of nitrates to groundwater and emissions of odors (Hoogervorst, 1990). These 
problems vary between regions according to the concentration of livestock in a region. 
Trade measures, such as restricting the import of grain substitutes to correct for these 
environmental problems, are second-best; the first-best policy is to reform the CAP such 
that the internal grain price equals world market price. European and national environ-
mental policies should be introduced to fight the negative external effects of existing 
production techniques. Increasing the competitiveness of grain compared to grain 
substitutes and internalisation of negative environmental effects of intensive livestock 
production into production costs may have negative concentration effects. Provided that 
these negative concentration effects outweigh positive concentration effects related to 
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infrastructure and technical know-how, intensive livestock production may shift to 
traditional grain producing regions. 
Thailand presents an interesting case of a country producing grain substitutes. 
Around 1980 about one million hectares were used for the production of cassave, which 
was mainly exported to the Netherlands. By producing cassave, minerals are taken from 
the soil and exported abroad. Fertilizers would be needed to restore the fertility of the 
soil. It is argued that cassave producers do not use fertilizers because export revenues 
from cassave are low compared to the price of fertilizers. The fertility of the soil 
therefore declines, which will have negative consequences for the future production 
capacity of the soil (Tamminga and Wijnands, 1991). Conflicting with this view is the 
argument that, despite direct or indirect government interference in trade flows of grain 
and grain substitutes, existing trade flows are the result of comparative advantages in 
production (Blom, 1990, Dijksterhuis, 1990). Thailand has a comparative advantage in 
the production of cassave. With respect to the sustainability of the production of cassave 
in Thailand, Dijksterhuis (1990) argues that the production of cassave is fairly sustai-
nable; after 20 years, there is still no significant reduction in soil fertility. The export of 
cassave accounts for an important share of total export revenues in Thailand. This 
illustrates that conclusions about the desirability of export of grain substitutes from 
developing countries cannot be drawn easily. If there are market failures, for example 
environmental problems, the first-best policy is to restore the market failure at its source, 
for example by environmental regulation (see section 2.2.1). Additional research will be 
required to assess the effects of trade restrictions on the environment. 
5.3 Energy resources 
Several aspects of the international trade in energy resources are presently in discussion; 
they range from energy trade between the EC and the former Eastern bloc countries, 
liberalizing the European natural gas trade, the question of energy (coal) producer 
subsidies, to international trade implications of the imposition of carbon taxes. Alternative 
trading rales influence the production and use of energy resources in the trading coun-
tries. As the production and use of energy resources have important local, regional and 
global environmental impacts, the environmental effects of trade in the energy sector 
should receive due attention. 
This case is based on a discussion paper by Langlois (1992), prepared for an OECD 
joint session of trade and environment experts in February 1992. Four issues are 
discussed: 1) the environmental effects of trade barriers (illustrated by energy-environ-
ment issues in the former Soviet bloc), 2) the environmental effects of trade liberalization 
(illustrated by the European natural gas trade), 3) the environmental effects of energy 
producer subsidies, 4) the environmental effects of pursuing environmental harmonization 
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in free trade areas (illustrated by the discussion in the EC about carbon taxes). The 
discussion of these issues may illustrate some of complexities of the links between 
international trade and the environment, while it also provides a brief introduction into to 
a highly topical area of research. 
Production and use of energy cause environmental side-effects. Given some level of 
energy consumption in a country, the extent of these effects depends on many factors 
such as the fuel-mix, the energy extraction and use of technologies, and the availability 
and use of pollution control technologies. These factors depend in turn on national or 
regional environmental regulations and standards, the availability of indigenous energy 
resources and energy use technologies, and on trade restrictions affecting either energy or 
technology or both. 
The former Soviet bloc presents a historic example of trade barriers affecting both 
energy use and environmental quality. The energy use in Eastern European countries 
depended on Soviet oil and gas and their own (brown) coal reserves. Because of the 
limited (state controlled) exports of Soviet oil and gas, the Eastern European satellite 
countries were not able to reduce their brown coal consumption. In 1989, brown coal 
consumption accounted for almost a third of the energy-mix. In Western Europe, brown 
coal accounted for only 3.5 percent of the energy-mix. 
The lack of access to Western resources and technology, highly distorting energy 
subsidies,18 and a lax or non-existent environmental policy have resulted in serious 
environmental degradation from both mining and energy use in Eastern Europe. In 
Czechoslovakia alone, some 35,000 hectares of agricultural land have been lost because 
of mining operations. Water resources have also been seriously affected. The combustion 
of fuel - especially brown coal - with virtually no pollution control measures, has resulted 
in an immense pollution. For example, while the emission of particulates averages about 
2.8 million tons in Czechoslovakia (1985), total Western European emissions average 
221,000 tons (1988). 
This example highlights an important link between international trade and the 
environment: barriers to trade may effectively arrest the introduction of clean energy 
resources and technologies. Even if the Eastern European countries had attempted to 
pursue environmental policies, these would have been much more expensive than if they 
had had access to foreign energy resources and technologies. Free trade would have 
allowed a much greater choice among fuels and compliance options, thereby reducing the 
costs of environmental control measures. The distorted energy prices due to energy 
subsidies have added to the problems tremendously. 
The question of liberalization of the EC natural gas trade can be analyzed much 
along the same lines. If barriers to free trade in natural gas could be abolished, natural 
18
 The World Bank suggests that half of the air pollution in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union is 
attributable to distorted energy prices (World Bank, 1992). 
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gas would become cheaper, and would thus be used more relative to 'dirtier' fuels (e.g. 
coal). Due to the increased use of a 'clean' fuel, environmental compliance costs would 
also be lower. 
The energy markets in Germany and the United Kingdom are highly distorted 
because of coal subsidies and official procurement rules for national steel companies and 
power plants. In Germany, half of the electric power generation is reserved to domestic 
coal, in the United Kingdom about two-thirds. The effect of these rules on overall pollu-
tion is governed by two opposite forces: on the one hand, electricity prices are higher 
than without such restrictions, thus reducing demand; on the other hand, fuel switching 
options to assist in meeting environmental standards would be greatly enhanced. 
Finally, international trade and competitiveness may be seriously affected with the 
introduction of carbon taxes. In turn, these potential trade and competitiveness impacts 
may seriously retard the introduction of such taxes. Regional free trade areas (e.g. the EC 
or the North American Free Trade Area) which are considering to introduce carbon taxes, 
face two problems. The first problem relates to trade with countries with no carbon taxes. 
Should this trade be left unaffected, or should the free trade region tax the carbon content 
of imported goods at its border? And likewise, remit the tax on the carbon content of 
exported goods? Is this an economically sound policy and is it administratively feasible? 
The second problem relates to the harmonization of carbon policy in the different member 
states of the free trade association. Should policies be harmonized in terms of goals or 
instruments? Harmonization of goals (equal carbon emission reductions) between member 
countries will almost certainly require different measures, including different taxes. 
Harmonization of instruments (equal tax rates) will result in different emission reductions. 
Border corrections and harmonization may both be captured by domestic industry to 
limit competition, in the sense that differences in costs, efficiency, endowments, and 
overall competitive advantages can be "harmonized" or "corrected". In cases like these, 
coalitions between environmental groups and (parts of) industry may result in very costly 
solutions, to the detriment of social welfare and ultimately also to the detriment of the 
environment. 
In sum, the links between international trade in the energy sector, energy and 
environmental policies, and environmental quality is highly topical from both a policy and 
a research point of view. This section has only touched upon some of the issues involved, 
and much work remains to be done in this field. 
5.4 Hazardous wastes 
One issue in which many aspects of the links between international trade and sustainable 
development are present is the international trade in hazardous wastes. The aspects 
include environmental risks, North-South relations, differences in national waste manage-
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ment policies, etc. This case is based on a study by Hilz and Ehrenfeld (1991) which 
examines several policy options for the international waste trade, ranging from free trade 
to a global ban on trade. This section presents the results of Hilz and Ehrenfeld (H-E), 
and then discusses these results in the light of our analytical framework, developed in 
chapter 2. 
Hilz and Ehrenfeld (H-E) first address the reasons for trade, based on national 
differences between the demand for, and the supply of waste disposal facilities. The 
demand for waste disposal facilities is influenced by the amount of waste produced by the 
economy, and by environmental regulation on the proper disposal of hazardous wastes 
(sea dumping, landfills, incineration). Supply of waste disposal facilities is influenced by 
natural conditions (land space, ground water characteristics), environmental standards in 
hazardous waste management, and public opposition to the siting of facilities. Due to the 
growth of the economy and tighter regulations, the total amount of hazardous wastes gen-
erated in the United States increased from 9 million tons in 1970 to 286 million tons in 
1986. The clean-up of old hazardous waste disposal sites has additionally increased the 
demand for disposal capacity. Tighter environmental standards and growing public 
opposition to hazardous waste facilities have sharply increased disposal costs: according 
to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency a "sixteenfold" increase since the early 
1970s. These developments have led to export of hazardous wastes to countries where 
disposal costs are lower. Costs of hazardous waste disposal (landfill) in the United States 
averaged $250 per ton in 1989; by contrast, the average disposal costs in several African 
countries was approximately $40 per ton (Rabe, 1991). According to H-E, estimates of 
the total volume of exports of hazardous wastes are rather speculative as national defini-
tions of hazardous wastes differ widely and large volumes may be involved in illegal or 
covert operations. One source estimated 1988 trade at more than 20 to 30 millions of 
tons, of which about 5 to 10 percent went to developing countries. However, another 
source estimated imports to Africa alone at about 24 million tons. Despite this uncer-
tainty, most authorities agree that the number of shipments and the total volume of 
hazardous and solid wastes have steadily increased in both Western Europe and the 
United States during the 1980s (Rabe, 1991). 
Uncontrolled trade in hazardous wastes has in the recent past led to some awkward 
international incidents. In 1988 the Nigerian government reacted sharply to the dumping 
of more than 4,000 tons of Italian hazardous waste in a rented backyard of a small 
Nigerian village. Nigeria recalled its ambassador from Rome and seized an Italian 
freighter in order to force the Italian government to take responsibility for the waste 
(Rabe, 1991). Other Western European countries and the United States have been 
involved in similar incidents, which have attracted much public attention. Incidents like 
these have led to policy initiatives to regulate international trade in hazardous wastes. 
These initiatives range from bilateral and regional agreements to larger international 
agreements such as the Basel Convention. Some developing countries have called for a 
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ban on trade between developed and developing countries and some have even proposed a 
global ban on the exports of hazardous wastes (for instance through the Organization of 
African Unity). This call for a global ban has been hailed by many environmental 
organizations. 
Due to their often poorly developed regulatory and administrative framework for 
managing hazardous wastes, hazardous waste disposal in developing countries may lead to 
near-term damage to human health and the environment, and long-term clean-up costs. 
However, in face of their debt burden, importing hazardous wastes generates valuable 
revenue. H-E argue that free trade exploits their urgent needs for foreign exchange at the 
costs of long-term damage. On the other side, by providing cheap disposal sites to 
industrial countries' hazardous wastes, free trade does not contribute to a sustainable haz-
ardous waste policy in the North, that is, a policy which emphasizes the reduction of 
waste generation to the minimum level possible. Bilateral agreements between rich and 
poor countries do not address these problems fundamentally. An example is the agreement 
between the United States and Mexico, which, despite its formal procedures and regula-
tions on control and monitoring of waste movements (including notification and consent), 
does not function properly mainly due to the poor institutional infrastructure for managing 
wastes in Mexico. Regional initiatives may lack administrative strength and international 
cohesion to enforce its objectives. Moreover, the exclusion of exporting and importing 
countries always present loopholes to such schemes. A global ban on trade in hazardous 
wastes is not considered feasible by H-E. The best way to reduce the environmental risks 
of the hazardous waste trade is through a global convention, such as the Basel Conven-
tion. 
The Basel Convention, drafted in 1989, established effective monitoring procedures 
through requirements for notification and prior consent, a manifest system, and a yearly 
report of a countries hazardous waste exports. The Convention also directs its Parties to 
adopt an environmentally sound management of hazardous wastes; it does not spell out, 
however, the exact meaning of "sound management". 
H-E give some recommendations to improve the Basel Convention. Two of these 
recommendations merit attention. First, H-E argue that the role of national sovereignty in 
environmental protection should be redefined. In particular, these sovereign rights should 
be limited in favour of an international agency which could, for instance, inspect waste 
disposal sites to check if wastes can be disposed of in an environmentally sound manner. 
The agency should also assist in cases of emergency. Second, H-E recommend that 
liability for damage to third parties should remain with the waste generator and should not 
be transferred to the owner of the disposal site. H-E see this as a strict interpretation of 
the Polluter Pays Principle, and it also reflects the notion that pollution prevention is 
better than pollution abatement. 
62 
Discussion 
Our analytical framework in chapter 2 established that without adequate environmental 
policies in the countries involved in trade with negative environmental side-effects, the 
"gains from trade" may be smaller than conventional analysis would suggest, and might 
even prove to be negative. However, the analytical framework also showed that trade 
measures, such as a global ban on trade in hazardous wastes, are usually not first-best 
solutions. Consequently, there must be scope for solutions which are more efficient, i.e. 
solutions which achieve environmental objectives at lower costs. 
These more efficient solutions should, in the first place, include policies to 
minimize (hazardous) waste generation. Any policy geared at sustainable development 
should be concerned with the reduction of waste generation. A ban on waste exports 
would, by denying low-cost opportunities for waste disposal, give some incentives to this 
objective. A tax on waste generation would accomplish the same. To force waste 
generators to use high-cost waste disposal sites, just to encourage waste reduction, would 
amount to taxing waste and giving all revenue to waste disposal site owners. This does 
not make much sense. 
In the second place, efficient solutions should include policies to encourage 
environmentally sound waste disposal management, especially in developing countries. 
The raison d'être of these policies is not only, and not even in the first place, to provide 
safe disposal facilities for imported wastes, but also to provide safe disposal sites for the 
increasing volume of hazardous wastes generated by developing countries themselves. 
Advocates of trade bans tend to overlook this point. Imports may not be the biggest 
source of hazardous wastes in the importing country, and certainly not the only threat. 
Therefore, with or without trade, policies should be geared towards improving waste 
disposal management globally. 
The issue of liabilities, raised by H-E, merits further research. On the one hand it 
seems to offer opportunities to apply the concept of integrated chain management in the 
context of international trade. Section 2.1 of this report already mentioned this issue. On 
the other hand, however, waste disposal site owners should not be entirely relieved of 
responsibilities. Moreover, it may be questionable whether the juridical concept of 
liability is a very powerful instrument of environmental policy in many countries. 
Trade in hazardous wastes is a global phenomenon; environmental damage is 
generated in one country and then transferred to other countries. It should therefore be 
addressed within a global policy framework, i.e. in an international environmental 
agreement, such as the Basel Convention. The relationship between international environ-
mental agreements and national sovereignty is a delicate one, but it is clear that in order 
to achieve effective global environmental policies, national sovereignty has to give way to 
some extent. The potential tension between global and national responsibilities is likely to 
be one of the major issues in the development and implementation of a new generation of 
international environmental agreements. 
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In sum, trade in hazardous wastes is a subject in which trade and environment are 
closely intertwined. Research into this subject necessarily touches upon major environ-
mental, economic, social, ethical and political questions. As with most trade and 
environment issues, the question transcends the issue of trade alone (to trade or not to 
trade) and should be studied within a wider context. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In the present study a number of conceptual issues regarding sustainable development, 
international trade and the environment are analysed. Based on this analysis, major 
environmental and trade policy questions are examined and the links between them 
illustrated with several case studies. From the discusssion of theoretical and policy issues, 
the following conclusions can be drawn and recommendations for further work be 
formulated: 
1. Most of the links between international trade and the environment are indirect. 
Changes in international trade flows may affect production, consumption, income, 
resource use, and technological change in the trading countries, which in their turn 
are likely to influence the environmental quality. Direct effects of international trade 
concern mainly transport-related environmental effects. An assessment of the overall 
environmental and welfare effects of a change in trade (e.g. trade liberalization) 
requires a careful specification of these direct and indirect relationships in empirical 
models. 
2. In the absence of adequate environmental policies, a change in international trade may 
have negative effects on the environment if it increases levels of economic activity or 
if it shifts economic activities to areas with lower environmental carrying capacities. 
On the other hand, it may have positive effects on the environment if it increases 
resource use efficiency, or if it shifts economic activities to areas with larger environ-
mental carrying capacities. In addition, trade-induced changes in income and income 
distribution may affect opportunities for environmental management. A priori, it is 
uncertain which effect will prevail in a specific situation. 
3. If changes in international trade increase environmental damage, through changes in 
production, consumption, etc., measures to restrict trade are usually not the first-best 
policy instruments to counteract this damage. First-best policy instruments address 
environmental consequences of production or consumption directly, by internalising 
environmental considerations in production and/or consumption decisions. Trade 
instruments are usually poor substitutes for environmental policies (as, for example, 
the four case studies show). Only in certain cases can they complement such policies. 
4. Environmental effects of trade-related activities (transport, storage, infrastructural 
facilities, etc.) are often neglected in studies on international trade and the environ-
ment. Further research into the quantitative significance of trade-related environmental 
externalities is needed. 
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5. It is important to assess the entire life cycle of a commodity from raw material to 
final product, since different types of environmental problems (e.g. resource 
depletion, pollution, waste disposal) may arise at different stages. Because of interna-
tional trade, these environmental problems may be located in different countries. 
Removal of trade barriers, and the anti-processing tendencies often implied in these 
barriers, will therefore have important effects on the intra-sectoral pattern of trade 
flows as well as on the location and magnitude of environmental problems related to 
each processing stage. 
6. Domestic or local environmental effects should be distinguished from international 
(transborder) and global environmental effects. As no supranational enforcement 
authority exists, international policies should be based on international agreements 
between sovereign states. 
7. As regards national environmental problems, international harmonization of environ-
mental standards is generally not desirable. Differences in national priorities, in 
environmental and natural resources, and in capacities to cope with environmental and 
natural resource degradation justify variations in environmental standards across 
countries. On the other hand, harmonization of the form of environmental policy 
(principles and measures) is highly desirable. Tensions between trade and the 
environment may be reduced by global adherence to the polluter pays principle (PPP). 
8. The benefit-cost ratio of measures to address international or global environmental 
problems may differ between countries. For tackling these problems, positive 
incentives (e.g. financial assistance, transfers of environment-friendly technology) may 
be needed to achieve cooperation of countries with small cost-benefit ratios (e.g. the 
cooperation of low-income timber-exporting countries in adressing global warming). 
Adherence to the PPP will generally lead to the non-cooperation of these countries. 
Negative incentives (e.g. discriminatory trade restrictions on unrelated products) may 
not be the best way to promote cooperation. 
9. A sector where changes in trade and environmental policies will have far-reaching 
consequences is agriculture. Compared to other activities, environmental effects are 
highly sector-specific and partly policy-induced. In low-income countries, agricultural 
production often leads to degradation of renewable resources like land, nutrients and 
water. At higher levels of income, farm inputs (labour and land) are increasingly 
being replaced by non-farm inputs (capital and variable inputs) which are produced by 
the industrial sector. The intensity of the resulting environmental effects differs 
considerably between different (groups of) countries. As international trade in agricul-
tural products includes many perishable and bulk products, their transportation may 
cause considerable environmental externalities. 
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10. Little research has been done thus far on the environmental effects of agricultural 
trade liberalization. Models of agricultural trade liberalization indicate that large 
regional shifts in agricultural production from industrial to developing countries would 
occur. The likely effeects of these shifts are a reduction of the use of chemicals in 
world food production, less problems with animal waste disposal, and reduced levels 
of chemical intake by the world's food consumers on average. 
11. Current studies on environmental effects of trade liberalization in agricultural products 
suffer from a number of shortcomings (insufficient product and process differenti-
ation, large geographical aggregates, different assumptions about environmental 
measures, partial equilibrium approach). For this reason, the generally positive 
conclusions about the environmental effects of agricultural trade liberalization need 
some qualifications. Further research is needed to address these shortcomings. 
12. Research on environmental effects of trade liberalization should pay particular 
attention to the effects on soil degradation in developing countries, which is often 
considered the most threatening environmental problem in these countries. Empirical 
work on the magnitude and direction of these effects is very limited and sometimes 
gives conflicting results (as in the case of the effects of trade in cassave on soil 
fertility in Thailand). 
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APPENDIX 
Selected data on international trade flows and levels of protection 
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Figure A.l Development of total merchandise world trade in billions of US dollar, 
1966-1989, by region. 
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Figure A.2 Development of total merchandise world trade in billions of US dollar, 
1966-1989, by commodity. 
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Figure A.3 Total merchandise trade flows between major country groupings in 1987 in 
billion US dollars. 
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Figure A.4 Total food and agricultural raw materials trade flows between major country 
groupings in 1987 in billion US dollars. 
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Figure A.5 Trade protection by tariffs and quantitative restrictions in a selection of 
developed and developing countries, around 1988. 
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Tariffs: for developed countries: average ad-valorem tariff for all products except fuels; 
for developing countries: tariffs and import charges as a percentage of the value of all 
imports. 
Quantitative restrictions: unweighed frequencies of application by tariff line per country 
weighted by import values. 
Source: UNCTAD, 1991 
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Figure A. 6 Frequency of nontariff measures for selected items in developed and devel-
oping countries (percentage of items affected) 
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Figure A.7 Protection of agriculture in selected developed countries (producer subsidy 
equivalents as a percentage of producer price*) 
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* Producer subsidy equivalent measures the value of the monetary transfers to farmers 
from consumers and taxpayers resulting from agricultural policy. 
Source: OECD, 1991 
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Figure A.8 Relative protection of agriculture compared with manufacturing in selected 
developing countries* 
Phi Col Bra Mex Nig Egy Per Tur Kor Ecu 
Phi: Philippines (1974)Egy: Egypt (1981) 
Col: Colombia (1978)Per: Peru (1981) 
Bra: Brazil (1980)Tur: Turkey (1981) 
Mex: Mexico (1980)Kor: Rep. of Korea (1982) 
Nig: Nigeria (1981)Ecu: Ecuador (1983) 
* Relative protection is calculated as (1 + EPRa)/(l + EPRm), where EPRa and EPRm 
are the effective rates of protection for agriculture and the manufacturing sector, 
respectively. A ratio of 1.00 indicates that effective protection is equal in both sectors; a 
ratio less than 1.00 means that protection is in favour of manufacturing. 
Source: UNCTAD, 1991 
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